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Abstract 
 
In this study we have made an attempt to investigate into the relationship between political regime 
type (that ranges from authoritarian to democratic) and the extent of globalization, which of late has 
been considered as a path to development. We have made use of the Democracy index (and its 
constituent indicators) provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit and the globalization index (and 
its constituent indicators) of the KOF. Applying canonical correlation analysis on the data we have 
made an attempt to look into the response of globalization to the quantitative measures of 
democratic (versus authoritarian) practices of the governments in 116 countries distributed over 
Asia, Africa, Australia/Oceania, Europe and the Americas. We have also tested the Lee thesis in the 
context of globalization as a path to development.  Our findings indicate that the empirical support 
to Lee’s thesis if extended to globalization as a path to development is superficial and does not 
withstand critical analysis. Contrary to Lee’s thesis, democracy promotes globalization. In African 
countries political discordance (at the national as well as international level) is not much favourable 
while in the Asian countries, political will, irrespective of regime type,  is more or less in concordance 
with globalization. Therefore, rather illusively, it so appears that democracies thwart development 
as well as globalization as a means to development by implication, while the reality is very different. 
Key words: Globalization, democracy, authoritarian regime, Lee thesis, canonical correlation, Asia, 
Africa, Europe, the Americas, Australia, Oceania. 
JEL Code:  F63, O54, O55, O56, O57   
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1. Introduction: This investigation has found its origin in the intrigue initiated by the so-called ‘Lee 
thesis’ which asserts that democracy hurts economic growth and development. If the ‘Lee thesis’ 
holds then, by implication, globalization as an engine of development, too, would be hurt by 
democracy and, therefore, democratic regimes would be antithetical to globalization. Hence, this 
study primarily purports to empirically investigate whether democratically governed countries in 
general have begotten lesser extent of globalization and juxtaposed to that whether countries 
having more authoritarian governments have attained more of globalization. Secondarily, this study 
also investigates into the instances where more democratically governed countries exhibit more 
extent of globalization and, on the contrary, authoritarian governments have thwarted globalization.    
2. Socio-economic systems as homeostatic ensembles: Socio-economic systems have three major 
aspects or subsystems organically knit into them, which are identified as material, psychic and 
organizational subsystems. The material aspects characterize natural endowments, geographical 
attributes including location, demographic wealth, man-made material wealth accumulated over 
time and so on. The psychic aspects characterise the animal spirit, the social psyche, the collective 
world view, the belief system, attitudes, etc. The organizational system has institutions or the body 
of all rules, formal as well as informal, that govern the activities of the people with regard to the 
elements of the system and the order in which they are put together, individual’s personal and inter-
personal conduct, individual’s conduct to the social entities and vice versa, etc. in general (and any 
deviance in following those rules are socially discouraged).  
At any given time, individuals (agents) act under the psychic forces mostly following the 
organizational constraints as well as the drive to exaptation (Gould, 1991) and set themselves to 
modify the material or organizational aspects of the system, successfully or otherwise. Individual as 
well as collective behaviour of agents has both a proximate and ultimate (functional or 
extraptational) cause and, therefore, the developmental history as well as the operation of current 
mechanisms matter (Buss, et al., 1998; MacDougall-Shackleton, 2011). Consequent upon the actions 
of an individual or a group of individuals, several types of feedbacks are set in motion that pervade 
throughout the system establishing homeostasis. In a lager frame, as time progresses the stress of 
material and organizational constraints as well as the impacts of individual actions accumulate. A 
specific energy builds up in a reservoir lying in the collective psyche or collective consciousness 
(Lorenz, 1950; Lehrman, 1953, Durkheim, 1997).  This collective reservoir activated by natural forces, 
external forces and chance factors alter the ranges of homeostasis. A shift takes place which may be 
gradual or explosive. In many cases, the collectively accumulated impacts of individual actions make 
a collocation that waits until a ‘critical mass’ gathers, which ignited by a moving cause swings into 
action or set in motion a powerful positive feedback releasing the accumulated energy in the 
collocation. Depending on a host of conditions as well as chance, some systems may progress 
(evolve) slowly and gradually while some other systems may show up a marked jump to attain a 
punctuated equilibrium and the stasis in it (Gersick, 1991; Arrow et al., 2004).   
Democracy provides freedom to the psychic aspects to alter the organizational and material aspects, 
the circumstances to materialize the adjustments and the requisite governance geared to welfare. 
Too strong regime thwarts realization of capabilities while too lax regime, a soft state, gives way to 
frittering away of capabilities to dissonance. 
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3. Political Regime as a part of organizational system:  A political regime is an institution that 
primarily performs five functions: (i) defence from external aggression, (ii) making of rules to be 
followed by the citizens and the offices, (iii) governance to supervise that rules are followed, (iii) 
adjudication, and (v) creation, provision and maintenance of public goods and services. The first four 
functions are mainly for maintenance of order. The last one includes conservation, development and 
promotion of public welfare.  Optionally, the government or the office that wields power to perform 
all the primary functions of a regime can (i) control the public opinion, (ii) enforce morality, (iii) 
interfere with custom and fashion, (iv) create culture, and (v) take up coercive actions or use the 
state machinery for its own perpetuation irrespective of its performance in discharging of its primary 
functions.  Democratic governments largely limit themselves to primary functions and permit the 
public opinion to evolve even if it is against their perpetuation in holding power, regardless of their 
performance in discharging their primary functions. On the other hand, authoritarian governments 
in varying scope indulge in the activities beyond the primary functions. In extreme conditions, 
authoritative governments take up the optional activities as their primary functions while the 
primary functions become optional activities.  
4. Political regime and development: Development means the movement upward of the entire 
social system (Myrdal, 1974). It may be noted that Myrdal’s notion of development includes Sen’s 
(Sen, 1999) notion of economic development (entailing political freedoms and transparency in 
relations among people, freedom of opportunity, including freedom to access credit, and economic 
protection from abject poverty), because no underdeveloped social system can provide the 
conditions that ensure freedom from hunger, freedom from tyranny and freedom of opportunity.  
Maintenance of law and order is necessary, but not sufficient, for development and hence the state 
must be pro-active to create the conditions for development.  This is so because the psychic and 
organizational subsystems of the socio-economic system have a strong tendency to homeostasis, 
arresting the transformation of material endowments and human capabilities to become resources 
(fruitfully exploited using appropriate technology in catering to the needs of the society). Secondly, 
economic underdevelopment itself has a negative feedback to weaken the political machinery 
leading to make a regime an ‘impervious state’.  In a democratic set up where the government is 
elected by the people, impervious states turn to Myrdal’s ‘soft state’ (Myrdal, 1970) that are 
protective of rent-seeking tendencies at all levels. They are unable to maintain law and order also. In 
autocratic or authoritarian conditions impervious states become tyrannical where rulers become 
self-seeking. Impervious states vitiate the social psyche, the collective world view, the belief system 
and attitudes which, in turn, arrest efficiency and economic growth. Under these conditions, the 
people exhibit only weak will to development.   
It is natural, then, to think that development needs either a massive help from without the system (a 
big push) or a benevolent and wise authoritarian ruler.  A ‘big push’ argument has been promoted by 
several economists, although only in matters of providing capital or technology. However, since 
institutions and the social psyche cannot be imported, a big push of capital or technology cannot 
succeed much. The benefits of Investment are marred by inefficiency and corruption while inflation 
and inequalities are amplified. Big push may also lead to dependency on external forces affecting 
socio-political freedom. In view of such possible consequences, an authoritarian regime with a wise 
and benevolent/liberal ruler remains to be the only condition for development. There are empirical 
instances in support of this line of thinking. China, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan 
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have had authoritarian governments. However, those governments could see through the benefits 
of welcoming multi-national corporations, foreign investment, advance technologies and apt 
management as their means to foster development. As the governments in those countries were 
authoritarian, they could also curb populist ranting, rent-seeking and the opposition to 
developmental activities effectively. They could make fast and firm decisions and implement them, 
resulting into rapid growth in those countries. On the other hand, India, a democratic country, 
lagged behind and possibly showed up the signs of being a soft state. For different reasons and in 
spite of a massive international aid, Pakistan, oscillating between week democracy and authoritarian 
regime as well as lacking a benevolent or liberal government, could not fast attain development. 
These empirical instances indicate that leadership quality and not the regime or the type of 
government make or mar socio-economic progress. It reminds us of the ‘philosopher king’ of Plato 
(Bloom, 1968; Reeve, 1988). This conclusion is also akin to the one found in Kautilya’s sutras wherein 
he points out that governance leading to order, efficiency, opulence and welfare lies in ruler’s being 
altruistic, humble and wise (the attributes of a sage-king) which attributes are cultivated only if he 
listens to the well-meaning advice of the wise ministers (Kangle, 1969).   
5. The Lee Thesis: Lee Kuan Yew, who was the first Prime Minister of Singapore and governed the 
country for three decades, was a development-minded and inspired authoritarian, albeit accused of 
promoting a culture of elitism among Singapore's ruling class. Lee, in liaison with a handful of other 
British-educated ethnic Chinese that he met in his Cambridge days, founded People's Action Party 
that monopolized the entire process of selecting and grooming of future political and economic 
talents in Singapore. He promoted nepotism and did not spare his critics. Lee also discriminated 
against non-ethnic Chinese citizens although he projected a multi-ethnic and cosmopolitan image of 
Singapore (Barr, 2014). In spite of all these, his economic policies were insightful and fruit-bearing. 
To fight against the unemployment problem and to promote economic development he created an 
atmosphere that attracted American, Japanese and European entrepreneurs and professionals to set 
up base in Singapore. His policies made Singapore an ace exporter of electronic goods and an 
international financial centre. Under his leadership, Singapore succeeded in moving from the third 
world economy to first world economy in a single generation.  
To safeguard and glorify his authoritarian image Lee held that the ultimate test of a political system 
is not in whether it is democratic or authoritarian, but in whether it improves the standard of living 
for the majority of people. For Lee, political freedom was secondary while economic prosperity was 
primary. Lee also promoted the thesis of ‘Asian values’ that had an incompatibility with the 
democratic practices. He argued, therefore, that democracy hurts economic development.  This 
hotly debated argument has taken up the name ‘the Lee thesis’ (Sen, 1999). Yet, it is true that one 
must consider the urgency of bread over freedom although man does not live by bread alone. 
6. Empirical relationship between political regime and development and Lee’s thesis: The issue has 
elicited many research studies. Przeworski and Limongi (1993) provide an extensive survey of 
literature on the topic up to the year 1992. We reproduce the summary of their literature survey (p. 
61) arranged according to the association of the type of political regime and development. 
Where authoritarian government performed better than the democratic government: Huntington 
and Dominguez (1975) studied 35 poor nations during the 1950s and found that authoritarian 
countries grew faster. Marsh (1979) studied 98 countries during 1955-1970 and found that 
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authoritarian countries grew faster. Weede (1983) studied 124 countries during 1960-1974 and 
found that authoritarian countries grew faster. Landau (1986) studied 65 countries during 1960-1980 
and found that authoritarian countries grew faster. Kohli (1986) studied 10 underdeveloped during 
1960-1982 and found that in the 1960s regimes did not matter for development, but in the 1970s 
authoritarian regimes performed slightly better than democratic countries. Helliwell (1992) studied 
90 countries during 1960-1985 and found that democracy has a negative, but statistically 
insignificant, effect on growth.  
Where democratic government performed better than the authoritarian government: Dick (1974) 
studied 59 underdeveloped countries for the period 1959-1968 and found that democratic countries 
developed slightly faster. Kormendi and  Meguire (1985) studied 47 countries during 1950-1977 and 
found that democratic countries grew  faster. Pourgerami (1988) studied 92 countries during 1965-
1984 and found that democratic countries grew faster. Scully (1988; 1992) studied 115 countries 
during 1960-1980 and found that democratic countries grew faster. Barro (1989) studied 72 
countries during 1960-1985 and found that democratic countries grew faster. Pourgerami (1991) 
studied 106 less developed countries in 1986 and found that democratic countries grew faster. 
Remmer (1990) studied 11 Latin American countries during 1982-1988 and found that democratic 
countries grew faster, but results were statistically insignificant. 
Where regime type conditionally, ambivalently or inconclusively affected development: Przeworski 
(1966) conducted a study on 57 countries for the period 1949-1963 and found that dictatorships 
helped the countries at medium level of development to grow faster. Adelman and Morris (1967) 
studied 74 underdeveloped countries (including communist bloc) for the period 1950-1964 and 
found that authoritarianism helped less and medium developed countries. Sloan and Tedin (1987) 
studied 20 Latin American countries during 1960-1979 and found that bureaucratic-authoritarian 
regimes do better than democracy while traditional dictatorships do worse. Marsh (1988) studied 47 
countries during 1965-1984 and found that there was no difference between regimes with regard to 
their impact on development. Grier and Tullock (1989) studied 59 countries during 1961-1980 and 
found that democracy performed better in Africa and Latin America while regime type did not make 
a difference in the development of Asian countries.  
Przeworski and Limongi (1993) concluded that we do not know whether democracy fosters or 
hinders economic growth. This inconclusiveness may be attributed to the problems of categorization 
(since all types of democratic or authoritarian governments are not identical). Barro (1997, p.50) 
points out that as evidenced by history dictators come in two types: one whose personal objectives 
often conflict with growth promotion and another whose interests dictate a preoccupation with 
economic development. Accordingly, an authoritarian government with the two opposite types of 
the leadership may have diametrically opposite effects on development. Measurement, modelling 
and mediation by or conditionality on other factors may also be responsible for blurring the 
relationship between regime type and development.  
A Lack of conclusiveness in the direct (immediate) relationship between regime type and 
development turned the interest of researchers to investigate into a triadic relationship between the 
regime type and the conditions that promote development and in turn into those conditions leading 
to development, although a quest of direct relationship between regime type and development 
continued.  Leblang (1997), Halperin et al. (2005) and Knutsen (2008a; 2008b) found that democratic 
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countries perform better at economic growth. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) show that the 
relationship between development and political regime is not a direct one. When political 
competition is limited and also when the power of the political elites (rulers) is threatened, they 
would block development (political replacement effect). Political elites are unlikely to block 
development when there is a high degree of political competition or when they are highly 
entrenched. Political replacement effect may be there in any type of regime. Boix (2003) and 
Knutsen (2007) found a positive effect of democracy on protection of property rights and rule of law. 
Knutsen (2008b) and Hegre and Fjelde (2008) found that democratic governments perform better on 
control of corruption. Rodrik (1998) found that democracy increases consumption through 
increasing wages.  As Myrdal (1972: p. 54) pointed out, increased consumption by workers in the 
underdeveloped countries may have efficiency-promoting effects leading to development which 
may more than compensate the opportunity cost of increased wages.  Summarizing the empirical 
findings on the relationship between the regime type and development Knutsen (2010) observed 
that globally, authoritarian regimes are associated with lower growth rates and higher levels of 
corruption. Even in Asia (for which the Lee’s thesis was purported to be valid) the thesis that 
authoritarian government will necessarily promote development cannot be generalized for all 
countries. The thesis is valid only for those countries that perchance had the authoritarian regime 
with development priorities.  However, if we accept authoritarian government as a path to 
development, there is no way to ensure that the rulers would have development priorities or they 
would be altruistic and wise or they would have well-meaning and wise ministers. Przeworski (2004) 
concluded that “there is not a single reason to sacrifice democracy at the altar of development.”  
7. Globalization as a mediating factor between regime and development: Until the World War-II, 
there were only two worlds, the capitalist and the socialist. Following the War, many countries that 
were colonies earlier assumed nationhood and those countries were categorised as those belonging 
to the third world. The third world countries were in an immediate need to politically consolidate 
them as well as to develop their economies. The countries of the first two worlds were deeply 
involved in the cold war for their politico-economic supremacy that also had an ideological basis. The 
countries of the third world mostly joined the Non-Aligned Movement keeping themselves at some 
comfortable and politically appropriate distance from the two power blocs. The countries of the first 
bloc took upon themselves the moral responsibility of finding out the methods or the path, possibly 
with the economic and intellectual assistance of the first world countries, that would develop the 
economies of the third world countries through democratic means (without turning to authoritarian 
socialism). In that process, the gamut of the theories of economic development prospered. 
Meantime, some counties with authoritarian government forged a cooperative link with the first 
world countries to promote their economic development through integrating their economies with 
the world market and altering their domestic policies to suit such cooperation. Nevertheless, until 
the dissolution of the USSR (the central force of the Socialist Bloc) most of the third world countries 
were resistant or cautiously open to integrate their economies with the world market. However, 
after 1991 (when the USSR disbanded), most of the third world countries began increasingly allowing 
the flow of goods, services, capital, management, people, ideas and cultures  across the national 
boundaries and removing obstacles to such flow. This integration with the world market and 
permeability to socio-economic forces may be considered as a mediating factor between regime 
type and development, making a triad. In the pre-globalization era, the governments in the third 
world countries had the responsibilities of mobilising the capital, adopting the appropriate 
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technologies and managing the economic activities or projects instrumental to development. After 
globalization, these responsibilities have been at least partly shifted to international market forces. 
Now, with the growing impact of globalization, the concern of the governments is more streamlined 
or possibly limited to retaining political sovereignty and correcting the market forces and the 
obnoxious effects of globalization such as income inequality, aberrative effects of socio-cultural 
misalliance, etc. In this sense, too, globalization is a mediating factor between regime and 
development. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate how regime types deal with globalization.  
8. A quest for empirical relationship between regime type and extent of globalization: Democracy 
and authoritarianism are at the two poles in the realm of political management of the society and 
they are heterogeneous, qualitative, multi-dimensional categories. Each one of them has its own 
history, society and culture behind it. Similarly, globalization is a multi-dimensional concept that has 
its economic, social and political aspects. Our objective in this investigation is to carry out a 
quantitative analysis that requires these qualitative multidimensional concepts to be represented 
quantitatively.  This venture has its own limitations and risk factors as well as its own attractiveness. 
A quantitative measure of regime type: Attempts have been made to quantify the regime types 
along a scale called Democracy Index with authoritarianism at the bottom and democracy at the top.  
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), a British business within the Economist Group that provides 
forecasting and advisory services through research and analysis, has published the Democracy Index 
for 2006, 2008 and 2011 and for every year afterwards. The index measures the state of democracy 
in 167 countries, of which 166 are sovereign states and 165 are UN member states. The index is 
based on 60 indicators grouped in five different categories or dimensions of regime ranging from 
democracy to authoritarianism. These five categories are:  Electoral process and pluralism (EPP), 
Functioning of government (FOG), Political participation (PPN), Political culture (PCL) and Civil 
liberties (CVL). Subsequently, these five measures of different aspects of democracy are suitably 
weighted and aggregated to yield an overall index (OSC, or the Index of Democracy with the score 
value in the range of zero to ten). On the basis of the score value (OSC) the political systems of 
different countries may be classified into Full democracies (score value in 8-10 range), Flawed 
democracies (score value in 6 to below-8 range), Hybrid regimes (score value in 4 to below-6 range) 
and authoritarian regimes (score value below 4).  
A quantitative measure of the extent of globalization: A number of indices have been devised to 
measure the extent of globalization of different countries and also to study the trends in 
globalization over time. Samimi (2011) reviews a number of such indices. Among them the KOF index 
of globalization (Dreher, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008) has been constructed for many countries for 45 
years (1970-2014) on an annual basis. It visualizes three aspects of globalization; economic, social 
and political. The economic dimension (E) of globalization takes into account: (1). E1 - actual 
economic flows such as trans-border trade, direct investment and portfolio investment, and (2). E2 - 
restrictions on trans-border trade as well as capital movement by means of taxation, tariff, etc. They 
are synthesized to make E. The social dimension (S) takes into account: (1) S1 - trans-border personal 
contacts such as degree of tourism, telecom traffic, postal interactions, etc., (2) S2 - flow of 
information, and (3) S3 - cultural proximity. They are synthesized to make S. The political dimension 
has only one aspect, P. At the second stage, E, S and P are synthesized (by a weighted aggregation 
achieved through the Principal Component Analysis) to give the KOF Index of globalization (Mishra, 
2017b). However, Mishra (2016; 2017a) argued in favour construction of a composite index by using 
Shapley values of the constituent variables to the composite index and called it Almost Equi-
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Marginal Contribution (AEMC) composite index. In this study we have used the AEMC index of 
globalization, though retaining the KOF (2017) index of globalization for the sake of comparison.  
Some details on our analysis: Our study includes 116 countries for which globalization data are 
available for 45 years (1970-2014). This choice is important in view of the fact that the KOF index of 
globalization uses all data (for 45 years and 207 countries), with or without adjustments as the 
availability of data permits. This option puts different countries on different footings (some countries 
could not opt for globalization before the dissolution of the USSR and some other countries were 
deficient in recording information or rendering them). Since KOF uses the Principal Component 
Analysis for deriving weights by subjecting all data for statistical analysis, this ‘footing effect’ is 
carried to the values of the overall index.  In view of this, we have constructed the AEMC index (for 
118 countries) for which all the data for 45 years (1970-2014) are made available by the KOF. 
However, among these 118 countries, the Democracy index values for two countries (Barbados and 
Seychelles) were not available on the EIU site.  Under these constraints, we have proceeded only 
with 116 countries.  
For establishing the relationship between the Democracy Index and the Globalization Index we have 
used globalization index values only for the period 2006-2014. We have obtained two vectors, the 
one that contains (for all 116 countries) the measures of globalization corresponding the maximal 
overall globalization index value scored by a particular country during 2006-2014 and the other that 
contains (for all 116 countries) the measures of globalization corresponding the minimal overall 
globalization index value scored by a particular country during 2006-2014. Symbolically,  let itΓ  be 
the value of the overall globalization index for the i
th
 country (i=1, 2,..., 116) and t
th
 year, t=2006, 
2007,..., 2014. From  itΓ we have chosen two vectors, say GH=
max
tikG ∈  = )(max it
t
Γ and GL= mintikG ∈ =
).(min it
t
Γ These two vectors together represent the range in which the globalization measured by 
the overall globalization index has been attained by the i
th
 country. Then, we carry out canonical 
correlation analysis for Democracy measures (EPP, FOG, PPN, PCL and CVL)2006 and globalization 
measures G
max 
[{E1, E2, S1, S2, S3, P}
max 
 for G
max
 or G
H
 corresponding to the year (Year-H) in which 
the overall globalization index was maximum]. Similarly, canonical correlation analysis has been 
carried out for Democracy measures (EPP, FOG, PPN, PCL and CVL)2006 and globalization measures 
G
min
 [{E1, E2, S1, S2, S3, P}
min 
for
 
G
min
 or G
L
 corresponding to the year (Year-L) in which the overall 
globalization index was minimum]. A special variant of canonical correlation analysis has been used. 
We have also done a similar analysis with Democracy measures (EPP, FOG, PPN, PCL and CVL)2016. 
9. Empirical basis (data) and findings of our analysis: In Table-1 we present the scores obtained by 
different countries on the quantitative assessment of democratic characteristics in different 
dimensions (compiled by the UK-based company the Economist Intelligence Unit). The OSC (Overall 
score of Democracy index) and its constituents (EPP=Electoral process and pluralism, FOG= 
Functioning of government, PPN=Political participation, PCL=Political culture and CVL=Civil liberties) 
are for the years 2006 and 2016.  
In Table-2.1 we present the measures of globalizations in three different dimensions, economic, 
social and political, as visualized by KOF. As pointed out earlier, the economic dimension has two 
measures, E1 and E2. The social dimension comprises S1, S2 and S3. The political dimension has only 
one measure, P. The overall indices of globalization are KOF (measured by KOF) and AEMC, 
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constructed by using Almost Equi-Marginal Contribution principle (Mishra, 2016; 2017a). The values 
(E1, E2 though KOF and AEMC) reported in the row against each country under study pertain to 
Year-H (G
max
 for Year-H) in which the AEMC index is highest during 2006-2014. These values present 
the optimistic or upper side attainment of globalization. In Table-2.2 we present the measures of 
globalization in the same manner as in Table-2.1, except that the numbers (for E1, E2 though KOF 
and AEMC) reported in the row against each country under study pertain to Year-L (G
min
 for Year-L) 
in which the AEMC index is lowest during 2006-2014. These values present the pessimistic or lower 
side attainment of globalization. 
Table-1. Scores Obtained by Countries on the Measures in Different Dimensions of  Democracy 
SL Country 
Dimensions of Democracy - 2006  Dimensions of Democracy - 2016 
OSC EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL  OSC EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL 
1 Albania 5.91 7.33 5.07 4.44 5.63 7.06  5.91 7.00 4.36 5.56 5.00 7.65 
2 Argentina 6.63 8.75 5.00 5.56 5.63 8.24  6.96 9.17 5.00 6.11 6.88 7.65 
3 Australia 9.09 10.00 8.93 7.78 8.75 10.00  9.01 9.58 8.93 7.78 8.75 10.00 
4 Austria 8.69 9.58 8.21 7.78 8.75 9.12  8.41 9.58 7.86 8.33 6.88 9.41 
5 Azerbaijan 3.31 3.08 0.79 3.33 3.75 5.59  2.65 0.50 2.14 3.33 3.75 3.53 
6 Burundi 4.51 4.42 3.29 3.89 6.25 4.71  2.40 0.33 0.79 3.89 5.00 2.65 
7 Belgium 8.15 9.58 8.21 6.67 6.88 9.41  7.77 9.58 8.57 5.00 6.88 8.82 
8 Benin 6.16 6.83 6.43 3.89 6.88 6.76  5.67 6.50 5.36 5.00 5.63 5.88 
9 Burkina_Faso 3.72 4.00 1.79 2.78 5.63 4.41  4.70 4.42 4.29 4.44 5.63 4.71 
10 Bulgaria 7.10 9.58 5.71 6.67 5.00 8.53  7.01 9.17 6.07 7.22 4.38 8.24 
11 Bolivia 5.98 8.33 5.71 4.44 3.75 7.65  5.63 7.00 5.36 5.00 3.75 7.06 
12 Brazil 7.38 9.58 7.86 4.44 5.63 9.41  6.90 9.58 6.79 5.56 3.75 8.82 
13 Bhutan 2.62 0.08 4.64 1.11 3.75 3.53  4.93 8.33 5.36 2.78 4.38 3.82 
14 Botswana 7.60 9.17 7.86 5.00 6.88 9.12  7.87 9.17 7.14 6.11 7.50 9.41 
15 C._Afr_Rep 1.61 0.42 1.43 1.67 1.88 2.65  1.61 1.75 0.36 1.11 2.50 2.35 
16 Canada 9.07 9.17 9.64 7.78 8.75 10.00  9.15 9.58 9.64 7.78 8.75 10.00 
17 Switzerland 9.02 9.58 9.29 7.78 8.75 9.71  9.09 9.58 9.29 7.78 9.38 9.41 
18 Chile 7.89 9.58 8.93 5.00 6.25 9.71  7.78 9.58 8.57 4.44 6.88 9.41 
19 China 2.97 0.00 4.64 2.78 6.25 1.18  3.14 0.00 4.64 3.33 6.25 1.47 
20 Cote_d'Ivoire 3.38 1.25 2.86 3.33 5.63 3.82  3.81 3.42 2.86 3.33 5.63 3.82 
21 Cameroon 3.27 0.92 3.21 2.78 5.63 3.82  3.46 2.00 3.21 3.89 4.38 3.82 
22 Congo_Rep. 2.76 4.58 0.36 2.78 3.75 2.35  2.91 1.67 2.86 3.33 3.75 2.94 
23 Colombia 6.40 9.17 4.36 5.00 4.38 9.12  6.67 9.17 7.14 4.44 4.38 8.24 
24 Costa_Rica 8.04 9.58 8.21 6.11 6.88 9.41  7.88 9.58 7.14 6.11 6.88 9.71 
25 Cyprus 7.60 9.17 6.79 6.67 6.25 9.12  7.65 9.17 6.43 6.67 6.88 9.12 
26 Germany 8.82 9.58 8.57 7.78 8.75 9.41  8.63 9.58 8.57 7.78 7.50 9.71 
27 Denmark 9.52 10.00 9.64 8.89 9.38 9.71  9.20 9.58 9.29 8.33 9.38 9.41 
28 Domin_Rep 6.13 9.17 4.29 3.33 5.63 8.24  6.67 8.75 5.71 5.00 6.25 7.65 
29 Algeria 3.17 2.25 2.21 2.22 5.63 3.53  3.56 2.58 2.21 3.89 5.00 4.12 
30 Ecuador 5.64 7.83 4.29 5.00 3.13 7.94  5.81 8.25 4.64 5.00 4.38 6.76 
31 Egypt 3.90 2.67 3.64 2.78 6.88 3.53  3.31 2.58 3.93 3.33 3.75 2.94 
32 Spain 8.34 9.58 7.86 6.11 8.75 9.41  8.30 9.58 7.14 7.22 8.13 9.41 
33 Ethiopia 4.72 4.00 3.93 5.00 6.25 4.41  3.60 0.00 3.57 5.56 5.63 3.24 
34 Finland 9.25 10.00 10.00 7.78 8.75 9.71  9.03 10.00 8.93 7.78 8.75 9.71 
35 Fiji 5.66 6.50 5.21 3.33 5.00 8.24  5.64 4.58 5.71 6.67 5.63 5.59 
36 France 8.07 9.58 7.50 6.67 7.50 9.12  7.92 9.58 7.14 7.78 6.25 8.82 
37 Gabon 2.72 0.50 3.21 2.22 5.63 2.06  3.74 2.58 2.21 4.44 5.63 3.82 
38 U.K. 8.08 9.58 8.57 5.00 8.13 9.12  8.36 9.58 7.14 7.22 8.75 9.12 
39 Ghana 5.35 7.42 4.64 4.44 4.38 5.88  6.75 8.33 5.71 6.11 6.25 7.35 
40 Guinea 2.02 1.00 0.79 2.22 3.75 2.35  3.14 3.50 0.43 4.44 4.38 2.94 
41 Gambia  4.39 4.00 4.64 4.44 5.63 3.24  2.91 1.75 3.21 2.22 5.00 2.35 
42 Greece 8.13 9.58 7.50 6.67 7.50 9.41  7.23 9.58 5.36 6.11 6.25 8.82 
43 Guatemala 6.07 8.75 6.79 2.78 4.38 7.65  5.92 7.92 6.07 3.89 4.38 7.35 
44 Guyana 6.15 8.33 5.36 4.44 4.38 8.24  6.25 8.33 5.36 6.11 4.38 7.06 
45 Honduras 6.25 8.33 6.43 4.44 5.00 7.06  5.92 9.17 5.71 3.89 4.38 6.47 
46 Haiti 4.19 5.58 3.64 2.78 2.50 6.47  4.02 5.17 2.21 2.22 3.75 6.76 
47 Hungary 7.53 9.58 6.79 5.00 6.88 9.41  6.72 9.17 6.07 4.44 6.88 7.06 
48 Indonesia 6.41 6.92 7.14 5.00 6.25 6.76  6.97 7.75 7.14 6.67 6.25 7.06 
49 India 7.68 9.58 8.21 5.56 5.63 9.41  7.81 9.58 7.50 7.22 5.63 9.12 
50 Ireland 9.01 9.58 8.93 7.78 8.75 10.00  9.15 9.58 7.86 8.33 10.00 10.00 
51 Iceland 9.71 10.00 9.64 8.89 10.00 10.00  9.50 10.00 8.93 8.89 10.00 9.71 
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52 Israel 7.28 9.17 6.64 7.78 7.50 5.29  7.85 9.17 7.50 8.89 7.50 6.18 
53 Italy 7.73 9.17 6.43 6.11 8.13 8.82  7.98 9.58 6.43 7.22 8.13 8.53 
54 Jamaica 7.34 9.17 7.14 5.00 6.25 9.12  7.39 9.17 6.79 5.00 6.88 9.12 
55 Jordan 3.92 3.08 3.79 3.89 5.00 3.82  3.96 4.00 4.29 3.89 4.38 3.24 
56 Japan 8.15 9.17 7.86 5.56 8.75 9.41  7.99 8.75 8.21 6.67 7.50 8.82 
57 Kenya 5.08 4.33 4.29 5.56 6.25 5.00  5.33 4.33 5.00 6.67 5.63 5.00 
58 Cambodia 4.77 5.58 6.07 2.78 5.00 4.41  4.27 3.17 5.71 3.33 5.00 4.12 
59 South_Korea  7.88 9.58 7.14 7.22 7.50 7.94  7.92 9.17 7.50 7.72 7.50 8.24 
60 Kuwait 3.09 1.33 4.14 1.11 5.63 3.24  3.85 3.17 4.29 3.89 4.38 3.53 
61 Lebanon 5.82 7.92 2.36 6.11 6.25 6.47  4.86 4.42 2.14 7.78 4.38 5.59 
62 Lesotho 6.48 7.92 6.43 4.44 6.25 7.35  6.59 8.25 5.36 6.67 5.63 7.06 
63 Luxembourg 9.10 10.00 9.29 7.78 8.75 9.71  8.81 10.00 8.93 6.67 8.75 9.71 
64 Morocco 3.90 3.50 3.79 2.78 5.63 3.82  4.77 4.75 4.64 4.44 5.63 4.41 
65 Moldova 6.50 9.17 4.29 6.11 5.00 7.94  6.01 7.92 4.29 6.11 4.38 7.35 
66 Madagascar 5.82 5.67 5.71 5.56 6.88 5.29  5.07 5.92 3.57 5.56 5.63 4.71 
67 Mexico 6.67 8.75 6.07 5.00 5.00 8.53  6.47 7.92 6.07 7.22 4.38 6.76 
68 Mali 5.99 8.25 5.71 3.89 5.63 6.47  5.70 7.42 3.93 4.44 6.25 6.47 
69 Malta 8.39 9.17 8.21 6.11 8.75 9.71  8.39 9.17 8.21 6.11 8.75 9.71 
70 Myanmar 1.77 0.00 1.79 0.56 5.63 0.88  4.20 3.17 3.57 4.44 6.88 2.94 
71 Montenegro 6.57 9.17 5.71 5.00 5.63 7.35  5.72 7.08 5.36 5.00 4.38 6.76 
72 Mongolia 6.60 9.17 6.07 3.89 5.63 8.24  6.62 9.17 5.71 5.00 5.00 8.24 
73 Mauritania 3.12 1.83 4.29 2.22 3.13 4.12  3.96 3.00 4.29 5.00 3.13 4.41 
74 Mauritius 8.04 9.17 8.21 5.00 8.13 9.71  8.28 9.17 8.21 5.56 8.75 9.71 
75 Malawi 4.97 6.00 5.00 3.89 4.38 5.59  5.55 6.58 4.29 4.44 6.25 6.18 
76 Malaysia 5.98 6.08 5.71 4.44 7.50 6.18  6.54 6.92 7.86 6.11 6.25 5.59 
77 Niger 3.54 5.25 1.14 1.67 3.75 5.88  3.96 4.75 2.21 2.22 3.75 6.76 
78 Nigeria 3.52 3.08 1.86 4.44 4.38 3.82  4.50 6.08 4.29 3.33 4.38 4.41 
79 Nicaragua 5.68 8.25 5.71 3.33 3.75 7.35  4.81 4.50 3.29 3.89 5.63 6.76 
80 Netherlands 9.66 9.58 9.29 9.44 10.00 10.00  8.80 9.58 8.57 8.33 8.13 9.41 
81 Norway 9.55 10.00 9.64 10.00 8.13 10.00  9.93 10.00 9.64 10.00 10.00 10.00 
82 Nepal 3.42 0.08 3.57 2.22 5.63 5.59  4.86 4.33 4.29 4.44 5.63 5.59 
83 New_Zealand 9.01 10.00 8.57 8.33 8.13 10.00  9.26 10.00 9.29 8.89 8.13 10.00 
84 Pakistan 3.92 4.33 5.36 0.56 4.38 5.00  4.33 6.00 5.36 2.78 2.50 5.00 
85 Panama 7.35 9.58 7.14 5.56 5.63 8.82  7.13 9.58 6.43 6.11 5.00 8.82 
86 Peru 6.11 8.75 3.29 5.56 5.00 7.94  6.65 9.17 5.36 6.11 4.38 8.24 
87 Philippines 6.48 9.17 5.36 5.00 3.75 9.12  6.94 9.17 5.71 7.22 4.38 8.24 
88 Poland 7.30 9.58 6.07 6.11 5.63 9.12  6.83 9.17 5.71 6.67 4.38 8.24 
89 Portugal 8.16 9.58 8.21 6.11 7.50 9.41  7.86 9.58 6.79 6.67 6.88 9.41 
90 Paraguay 6.16 7.92 5.00 5.00 4.38 8.53  6.27 8.33 5.71 5.00 4.38 7.94 
91 Romania 7.06 9.58 6.07 6.11 5.00 8.53  6.62 9.17 5.71 5.00 5.00 8.24 
92 Rwanda 3.82 3.00 3.57 2.22 5.00 5.29  3.07 0.83 5.00 2.22 4.38 2.94 
93 Saudi_Arabia 1.92 0.00 2.36 1.11 4.38 1.76  1.93 0.00 2.86 2.22 3.13 1.47 
94 Senegal 5.37 7.00 5.00 3.33 5.63 5.88  6.21 7.92 5.36 4.44 6.25 7.06 
95 Singapore 5.89 4.33 7.50 2.78 7.50 7.35  6.38 4.33 7.86 6.11 6.25 7.35 
96 Sierra_Leone 3.57 5.25 2.21 2.22 3.75 4.41  4.55 6.58 1.86 2.78 6.25 5.29 
97 El_Salvador 6.22 9.17 5.43 3.89 4.38 8.24  6.64 9.17 6.07 4.44 5.00 8.53 
98 Sweden 9.88 10.00 10.00 10.00 9.38 10.00  9.39 9.58 9.64 8.33 10.00 9.41 
99 Swaziland 2.93 1.75 2.86 2.22 3.13 4.71  3.03 0.92 2.86 2.22 5.63 3.53 
100 Syr_Arab_Rep 2.36 0.00 1.79 1.67 6.88 1.47  1.43 0.00 0.00 2.78 4.38 0.00 
101 Chad 1.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 3.24  1.50 0.00 0.00 1.11 3.75 2.65 
102 Togo 1.75 0.00 0.79 0.56 5.63 1.76  3.32 3.58 1.14 2.78 5.00 4.12 
103 Thailand 5.67 4.83 6.43 5.00 5.63 6.47  4.92 4.50 3.93 5.00 5.00 6.18 
104 Trinid&Tobago 7.18 9.17 6.79 6.11 5.63 8.24  7.10 9.58 7.14 5.56 5.00 8.24 
105 Tunisia 3.06 0.00 2.36 2.22 6.88 3.82  6.40 6.00 6.07 7.78 6.25 5.58 
106 Turkey 5.70 7.92 6.79 4.44 3.75 5.59  5.04 5.83 6.07 5.00 5.63 2.65 
107 Tanzania 5.18 6.00 3.93 5.06 5.63 5.29  5.76 7.00 5.00 5.56 6.25 5.00 
108 Uganda 5.14 4.33 3.93 4.44 6.25 6.76  5.26 5.25 3.57 4.44 6.88 6.18 
109 Uruguay 7.96 10.00 8.21 5.00 6.88 9.71  8.17 10.00 8.93 4.44 7.50 10.00 
110 U.S.A. 8.22 8.75 7.86 7.22 8.75 8.53  7.98 9.17 7.14 7.22 8.13 8.24 
111 Venezuela_RB 5.42 7.00 3.64 5.56 5.00 5.88  4.68 5.67 2.50 5.56 4.38 5.29 
112 Vietnam 2.75 0.83 4.29 2.78 4.38 1.47  3.38 0.00 3.21 3.89 6.88 2.94 
113 Yemen_Rep. 2.98 2.67 2.71 2.78 4.38 2.35  2.07 0.00 0.00 4.44 5.00 0.88 
114 South_Africa 7.91 8.75 7.86 7.22 6.88 8.82  7.41 7.92 7.86 8.33 5.00 7.94 
115 Congo_D_Rep. 2.76 4.58 0.36 2.78 3.75 2.35  1.93 0.92 0.71 2.78 4.38 0.88 
116 Zambia 5.25 5.25 4.64 3.33 6.25 6.76  5.99 7.08 5.36 3.89 6.88 6.76 
OSC=Overall Score; EPP=Electoral Process and Pluralism; FOG=Functioning of Government; PPN=Political Participation; PCL=Political 
Culture; CVL=Political Liberties; REG=Regime (1-Full Democracy, 2- Flawed Democracy, 3-Hybrid Regime and 4-Authoritarian) 
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Table-2.1. Economic, Social and Political Dimensions and Overall Indices of Globalization in Different Countries 
SL Country Year-H E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P KOF AEMC 
1 Albania 2009 56.57 73.00 52.55 73.90 2.42 80.69 61.60 61.61 
2 Argentina 2008 45.92 39.11 43.30 71.50 41.47 92.07 59.95 59.19 
3 Australia 2007 74.79 81.24 73.40 87.55 94.03 89.71 83.80 84.03 
4 Austria 2007 89.34 86.56 87.06 92.06 95.54 96.86 91.87 93.95 
5 Azerbaijan 2007 67.38 63.70 37.92 77.61 34.96 54.01 57.02 54.69 
6 Burundi 2014 23.53 33.37 21.02 37.22 3.10 62.17 35.04 34.79 
7 Belgium 2007 96.71 82.81 81.94 96.39 91.22 97.67 92.41 93.75 
8 Benin 2014 53.79 42.92 28.55 39.46 2.48 75.17 46.67 48.99 
9 Burkina_Faso 2014 59.67 46.84 19.43 44.62 2.17 76.88 48.69 49.12 
10 Bulgaria 2013 80.04 72.93 51.55 77.71 85.30 84.96 76.98 76.34 
11 Bolivia 2006 62.03 59.79 39.52 51.01 3.78 75.69 54.42 56.38 
12 Brazil 2014 51.77 52.82 24.46 70.50 39.58 94.30 61.40 58.16 
13 Bhutan 2014 60.64 56.77 46.83 45.54 6.87 38.85 43.58 47.07 
14 Botswana 2008 77.58 59.64 59.54 57.17 5.88 59.28 55.50 60.64 
15 C._Afr_Rep 2014 49.56 28.29 13.44 40.71 2.24 58.39 36.34 37.27 
16 Canada 2007 76.20 82.03 80.78 94.74 96.09 92.91 87.15 87.51 
17 Switzerland 2014 95.02 70.51 91.77 87.57 94.47 93.40 88.79 93.18 
18 Chile 2007 82.68 87.08 41.25 77.69 41.18 87.67 74.31 72.77 
19 China 2014 43.49 62.19 18.71 65.65 78.37 84.26 62.02 56.85 
20 Cote_d'Ivoire 2007 63.35 40.17 41.85 52.15 2.85 70.72 49.83 53.08 
21 Cameroon 2014 44.96 38.31 16.91 52.02 2.24 73.16 44.20 42.75 
22 Congo_Rep. 2014 96.24 41.58 35.45 43.93 1.25 63.67 51.83 57.31 
23 Colombia 2013 58.32 57.38 33.46 69.69 38.12 79.65 60.15 58.23 
24 Costa_Rica 2007 64.79 73.30 60.37 78.75 45.65 58.63 63.66 63.45 
25 Cyprus 2008 93.50 84.06 88.10 95.69 93.84 78.36 87.32 89.36 
26 Germany 2007 81.36 84.49 76.35 87.52 92.57 92.43 86.48 87.44 
27 Denmark 2007 87.80 89.09 83.64 89.59 93.06 93.75 90.01 91.90 
28 Domin_Rep 2014 64.15 59.56 53.70 64.97 79.14 73.31 66.45 67.20 
29 Algeria 2006 55.36 52.55 32.39 64.92 1.93 80.65 54.00 53.32 
30 Ecuador 2006 55.97 46.00 36.82 65.37 38.22 79.01 57.39 56.77 
31 Egypt 2013 42.96 48.68 27.64 66.78 77.77 93.01 63.10 59.62 
32 Spain 2007 78.33 81.36 74.93 87.72 90.22 95.93 85.92 86.71 
33 Ethiopia 2014 24.93 28.39 19.32 33.17 2.85 82.51 39.33 39.87 
34 Finland 2007 85.16 87.39 72.07 90.60 91.67 91.64 87.22 87.36 
35 Fiji 2014 74.43 25.70 56.98 57.20 43.56 69.68 57.56 61.30 
36 France 2007 76.99 87.19 80.56 88.36 91.79 97.96 88.23 89.36 
37 Gabon 2014 75.55 42.75 52.22 63.44 2.36 72.30 55.96 59.46 
38 U.K. 2006 81.91 89.75 79.57 90.54 93.30 94.90 89.06 89.91 
39 Ghana 2014 62.30 54.48 27.85 45.77 3.96 85.72 54.17 55.67 
40 Guinea 2014 57.21 31.29 21.72 41.38 2.73 76.19 44.40 46.82 
41 Gambia  2006 70.76 49.68 45.63 57.79 6.31 61.86 51.78 54.92 
42 Greece 2007 68.15 83.53 76.51 83.41 85.44 92.38 82.59 83.44 
43 Guatemala 2014 48.00 74.96 26.23 57.23 42.95 83.01 60.42 57.71 
44 Guyana 2006 80.52 62.07 56.43 55.51 44.10 43.34 56.44 59.99 
45 Honduras 2014 74.61 71.19 28.45 58.46 39.51 71.84 61.42 60.57 
46 Haiti 2010 34.21 62.93 28.71 50.84 1.00 45.88 39.36 38.47 
47 Hungary 2009 92.14 85.86 65.93 89.31 89.62 91.47 86.99 87.02 
48 Indonesia 2014 56.25 71.79 20.40 49.92 33.89 86.83 59.65 57.96 
49 India 2014 43.78 44.93 14.10 45.12 32.98 91.23 52.38 50.87 
50 Ireland 2014 99.52 89.78 89.37 91.72 91.88 90.47 92.15 95.20 
51 Iceland 2008 89.32 64.89 81.47 80.36 91.88 70.11 77.86 81.39 
52 Israel 2010 71.59 83.51 75.06 67.25 90.37 80.29 78.15 80.79 
53 Italy 2007 68.17 83.24 70.46 78.72 86.52 97.92 82.85 83.57 
54 Jamaica 2007 80.64 70.00 63.13 69.52 7.11 68.56 62.72 66.57 
55 Jordan 2006 79.36 59.47 67.97 71.54 41.11 84.27 70.31 73.94 
56 Japan 2014 50.41 76.54 43.39 75.59 87.91 88.10 72.26 68.81 
57 Kenya 2007 27.19 46.79 29.61 46.02 3.72 82.92 46.46 45.80 
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58 Cambodia 2014 85.86 50.76 29.52 48.48 1.31 62.36 50.69 54.22 
59 South_Korea  2014 62.52 63.76 43.81 73.55 42.42 89.58 67.03 66.05 
60 Kuwait 2008 61.31 75.01 78.96 76.28 90.41 59.54 70.76 72.18 
61 Lebanon 2006 86.92 62.30 70.38 81.04 43.26 74.55 70.50 74.20 
62 Lesotho 2014 80.48 41.22 25.58 48.74 6.87 54.09 45.94 48.77 
63 Luxembourg 2007 100.00 88.46 96.09 97.51 48.25 80.06 85.62 89.59 
64 Morocco 2014 60.71 53.68 45.87 83.86 37.71 89.50 65.95 64.33 
65 Moldova 2007 67.96 69.67 44.90 84.17 39.27 67.22 64.04 61.70 
66 Madagascar 2014 62.47 36.71 11.21 48.02 2.73 65.10 42.90 42.98 
67 Mexico 2014 63.45 68.45 44.30 68.92 40.12 71.72 62.29 61.61 
68 Mali 2014 50.97 41.67 22.46 44.10 1.12 75.98 46.07 46.72 
69 Malta 2009 99.76 87.06 83.18 96.04 49.74 52.58 76.16 78.24 
70 Myanmar 2014 56.93 56.33 11.89 42.07 1.00 44.74 39.03 38.40 
71 Montenegro 2010 81.65 79.55 72.69 94.41 5.08 56.33 65.48 66.92 
72 Mongolia 2014 84.88 65.73 16.76 59.40 1.43 71.89 56.91 55.63 
73 Mauritania 2014 79.30 58.16 19.77 51.82 1.37 66.99 51.45 52.55 
74 Mauritius 2014 91.12 84.89 58.78 82.06 42.61 45.32 66.61 66.81 
75 Malawi 2013 49.90 52.47 26.25 41.95 6.99 64.35 45.40 46.09 
76 Malaysia 2010 89.03 69.62 64.71 75.92 87.52 83.17 79.12 81.07 
77 Niger 2014 54.67 50.44 32.41 35.30 1.74 74.33 47.92 50.86 
78 Nigeria 2009 65.10 47.51 12.39 52.93 3.47 89.37 54.36 52.53 
79 Nicaragua 2012 61.15 61.69 34.97 56.57 40.24 57.38 53.99 53.56 
80 Netherlands 2014 97.64 88.48 85.98 93.26 92.75 95.41 92.84 95.24 
81 Norway 2013 80.32 72.93 81.74 85.52 91.68 92.27 84.48 86.83 
82 Nepal 2013 13.26 39.95 24.97 44.85 2.79 70.69 38.18 36.70 
83 New_Zealand 2008 76.62 90.04 79.32 91.46 50.44 80.05 79.17 80.12 
84 Pakistan 2007 40.85 43.25 23.40 44.12 32.38 87.55 51.83 51.16 
85 Panama 2009 89.59 71.32 50.84 81.17 47.74 60.74 67.70 67.56 
86 Peru 2011 69.02 82.53 32.33 58.27 36.87 84.74 66.14 65.24 
87 Philippines 2006 65.22 52.73 30.26 49.70 39.96 81.96 58.39 59.19 
88 Poland 2014 77.73 76.38 57.40 92.23 89.22 88.82 81.32 79.32 
89 Portugal 2007 82.71 87.10 76.48 91.10 88.73 93.85 87.61 88.21 
90 Paraguay 2012 62.44 56.59 36.33 65.09 39.86 77.61 60.13 59.39 
91 Romania 2014 60.67 83.22 48.07 82.02 82.39 89.82 76.51 73.36 
92 Rwanda 2014 34.81 63.91 17.27 39.87 7.05 71.53 45.56 43.83 
93 Saudi_Arabia 2009 62.95 76.19 69.00 71.18 83.25 60.43 68.43 69.75 
94 Senegal 2012 57.58 47.32 29.33 58.91 3.53 87.90 54.64 54.59 
95 Singapore 2009 99.01 95.35 92.18 88.25 96.12 71.77 88.27 91.52 
96 Sierra_Leone 2011 69.70 46.89 19.84 38.92 3.16 65.10 45.90 48.29 
97 El_Salvador 2007 61.06 72.79 49.35 64.68 40.80 75.40 63.79 64.02 
98 Sweden 2007 88.33 86.26 80.84 84.38 94.73 96.03 89.41 91.73 
99 Swaziland 2014 77.83 43.61 59.31 60.20 6.37 36.55 47.48 51.92 
100 Syr_Arab_Rep 2011 53.48 55.43 51.94 65.49 1.00 52.73 48.93 50.02 
101 Chad 2006 55.49 27.21 23.94 32.35 2.91 60.04 38.37 41.70 
102 Togo 2014 78.62 46.54 25.04 57.99 3.72 73.38 53.70 54.25 
103 Thailand 2012 83.87 59.54 42.90 72.93 80.93 81.22 72.06 71.71 
104 Trinid&Tobago 2012 86.13 68.86 58.65 67.24 41.73 53.54 63.09 65.62 
105 Tunisia 2008 70.83 48.71 41.68 76.78 2.67 86.29 60.45 60.63 
106 Turkey 2014 51.09 66.13 50.76 72.49 81.59 91.88 71.33 69.88 
107 Tanzania 2007 35.61 53.20 16.78 31.93 3.04 55.74 37.71 37.42 
108 Uganda 2013 44.01 58.02 21.59 37.01 4.52 70.23 45.48 45.69 
109 Uruguay 2008 65.66 68.87 51.35 65.92 42.10 85.45 67.23 68.14 
110 U.S.A. 2007 65.17 85.34 67.13 82.45 91.90 92.10 81.80 81.15 
111 Venezuela_RB 2006 62.32 47.83 38.48 68.43 41.65 65.68 56.17 55.45 
112 Vietnam 2014 80.26 49.28 16.43 63.78 31.92 71.13 56.69 54.98 
113 Yemen_Rep. 2008 53.37 63.83 23.57 41.91 1.68 62.24 46.51 46.66 
114 South_Africa 2014 72.64 65.18 41.53 61.39 41.93 88.04 66.72 67.54 
115 Congo_D_Rep. 2013 69.13 37.26 6.23 43.38 1.00 62.03 41.67 42.31 
116 Zambia 2007 64.24 63.96 27.92 45.69 4.09 73.93 52.96 54.04 
E1, E2, S1, S2, S3, P and KOF are for the Year-H when the overall index AEMC attained maximum (Gmax) during 2006-2014 
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Table-2.2. Economic, Social and Political Dimensions and Overall Indices of Globalization in Different Countries 
SL Country Year-L E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P KOF AEMC 
1 Albania 2006 35.89 58.68 52.56 69.39 2.24 67.63 51.18 50.86 
2 Argentina 2012 41.13 30.68 43.54 72.69 40.54 92.83 57.89 57.09 
3 Australia 2013 68.41 78.01 73.79 85.80 92.90 90.42 81.97 82.24 
4 Austria 2013 85.52 76.50 86.51 91.31 95.46 96.36 89.09 91.36 
5 Azerbaijan 2009 59.96 57.99 38.90 78.95 34.51 55.51 55.35 52.78 
6 Burundi 2006 24.06 35.17 16.96 35.39 4.15 36.97 27.89 26.92 
7 Belgium 2013 95.51 73.19 84.04 96.99 91.01 96.51 90.70 92.32 
8 Benin 2006 28.32 40.26 28.88 35.40 2.54 71.83 40.22 41.61 
9 Burkina_Faso 2006 16.39 50.78 32.95 36.90 3.90 71.57 40.68 41.27 
10 Bulgaria 2010 71.76 74.41 50.21 82.83 40.81 83.13 70.59 69.36 
11 Bolivia 2011 56.44 50.56 37.79 58.44 2.91 76.81 52.76 53.62 
12 Brazil 2008 48.27 53.34 20.26 68.50 38.23 92.27 59.38 55.59 
13 Bhutan 2007 34.97 56.40 46.37 41.28 5.32 21.18 33.12 35.44 
14 Botswana 2012 60.07 53.50 56.45 55.16 4.95 39.77 45.21 49.05 
15 C._Afr_Rep 2007 40.14 22.02 15.27 32.43 2.24 57.98 32.80 34.45 
16 Canada 2013 74.03 77.68 81.23 92.24 94.97 92.94 85.60 86.39 
17 Switzerland 2011 94.70 60.22 91.35 89.06 94.96 92.44 86.84 91.37 
18 Chile 2013 77.71 75.92 38.21 76.16 40.69 88.74 71.11 69.54 
19 China 2012 41.21 56.27 16.75 65.54 78.02 84.80 60.42 55.12 
20 Cote_d'Ivoire 2013 56.86 36.44 29.24 53.69 2.61 74.19 47.92 48.82 
21 Cameroon 2010 35.79 41.44 16.83 51.95 2.73 70.25 42.67 40.16 
22 Congo_Rep. 2008 91.35 37.23 31.94 40.90 1.74 39.88 42.91 47.78 
23 Colombia 2008 54.98 42.87 30.73 70.80 38.22 78.48 56.48 54.44 
24 Costa_Rica 2013 62.90 66.25 55.31 81.31 45.89 59.43 62.05 61.03 
25 Cyprus 2006 91.53 84.62 86.55 95.34 47.57 59.05 76.11 78.44 
26 Germany 2013 75.94 73.34 79.32 85.40 92.01 91.93 83.41 85.16 
27 Denmark 2013 84.52 80.70 81.47 88.35 93.53 91.65 86.99 88.85 
28 Domin_Rep 2009 54.07 57.06 53.37 67.39 36.62 56.88 55.00 55.44 
29 Algeria 2007 49.62 47.76 33.94 64.81 2.05 48.49 43.47 42.36 
30 Ecuador 2014 40.55 36.53 34.14 62.25 38.21 80.97 52.78 51.64 
31 Egypt 2012 41.62 46.07 22.45 66.66 35.94 93.45 56.99 53.67 
32 Spain 2013 75.24 74.68 73.88 86.21 89.60 95.51 83.68 84.60 
33 Ethiopia 2011 28.98 21.94 10.54 29.29 2.17 81.88 36.82 37.47 
34 Finland 2009 77.81 86.19 72.26 88.86 91.36 90.25 85.08 85.04 
35 Fiji 2009 64.73 25.64 56.01 50.18 43.87 66.56 53.75 57.81 
36 France 2013 73.58 78.12 81.13 89.14 92.48 97.29 86.09 87.32 
37 Gabon 2011 75.77 31.78 51.97 61.25 2.36 51.11 47.92 51.79 
38 U.K. 2014 80.71 85.27 76.35 87.66 93.64 94.67 87.26 88.15 
39 Ghana 2008 36.37 51.83 35.82 43.80 4.52 83.98 49.19 50.64 
40 Guinea 2010 35.70 31.29 21.36 39.92 4.15 71.90 39.38 40.45 
41 Gambia  2009 50.86 50.47 45.99 61.95 5.38 64.80 50.18 51.12 
42 Greece 2012 61.28 77.37 75.14 84.24 84.42 91.33 79.82 80.21 
43 Guatemala 2010 46.46 68.40 27.08 56.03 43.98 82.47 58.89 56.59 
44 Guyana 2013 61.74 58.98 48.79 58.06 5.76 44.66 47.60 49.78 
45 Honduras 2010 63.36 65.10 30.16 60.23 39.72 70.29 58.38 57.05 
46 Haiti 2014 35.21 68.47 6.41 51.82 1.00 48.28 38.81 34.53 
47 Hungary 2011 91.22 81.45 66.67 89.18 90.33 90.93 86.05 86.30 
48 Indonesia 2008 49.64 69.02 17.85 47.95 33.79 84.05 56.64 54.53 
49 India 2006 35.28 43.76 13.64 46.46 32.53 89.37 50.22 47.98 
50 Ireland 2008 97.80 88.49 91.12 92.11 48.10 87.41 85.93 89.89 
51 Iceland 2013 89.48 59.80 80.56 78.37 50.11 54.09 67.32 71.77 
52 Israel 2011 69.88 76.98 75.38 66.87 90.37 65.01 72.46 75.13 
53 Italy 2013 64.98 75.44 70.42 78.44 88.21 97.52 80.94 81.77 
54 Jamaica 2014 73.94 51.72 57.00 67.13 6.93 72.58 58.43 62.05 
55 Jordan 2013 72.22 61.91 52.07 69.51 42.37 86.09 67.93 69.18 
56 Japan 2011 43.92 65.57 42.19 76.22 87.85 88.66 69.25 65.61 
57 Kenya 2012 25.69 44.87 19.21 48.47 3.59 82.94 45.16 42.55 
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58 Cambodia 2011 70.40 50.86 26.14 44.44 2.17 59.93 46.83 49.02 
59 South_Korea  2006 54.55 65.58 39.06 76.10 41.38 83.59 63.92 61.36 
60 Kuwait 2013 53.45 65.47 70.68 73.63 89.69 60.31 66.44 67.03 
61 Lebanon 2011 77.07 56.80 70.26 90.02 45.95 60.76 65.70 67.36 
62 Lesotho 2006 59.43 37.57 24.70 45.45 6.68 33.39 35.69 36.96 
63 Luxembourg 2006 99.72 87.43 96.37 96.87 48.06 60.97 80.05 83.89 
64 Morocco 2006 49.22 40.66 35.46 67.40 37.20 87.73 57.63 56.51 
65 Moldova 2014 60.52 63.40 40.67 84.06 37.77 69.00 61.39 58.36 
66 Madagascar 2011 56.71 28.24 8.15 49.42 2.67 63.64 39.71 39.25 
67 Mexico 2008 55.23 60.32 42.67 70.30 41.09 70.95 59.27 57.99 
68 Mali 2007 44.08 41.64 20.96 36.32 2.17 73.60 43.06 44.06 
69 Malta 2006 97.19 87.13 83.62 96.07 50.17 47.77 74.50 76.39 
70 Myanmar 2009 47.20 49.84 9.82 27.94 1.00 36.00 31.86 32.04 
71 Montenegro 2006 52.52 76.75 73.23 94.86 6.25 46.57 57.31 56.97 
72 Mongolia 2006 54.54 60.02 19.54 57.15 2.05 65.31 48.72 46.41 
73 Mauritania 2006 72.75 40.60 25.64 43.51 1.37 45.02 40.79 43.65 
74 Mauritius 2006 57.62 70.87 59.49 85.06 40.57 57.79 61.85 60.47 
75 Malawi 2009 32.32 44.30 27.07 39.17 6.74 61.73 39.76 40.16 
76 Malaysia 2014 88.91 66.95 57.96 77.28 87.65 83.69 78.14 79.14 
77 Niger 2007 24.17 37.19 32.59 30.52 1.68 71.94 38.88 41.05 
78 Nigeria 2014 46.48 52.49 9.46 46.64 1.43 90.79 50.24 48.17 
79 Nicaragua 2008 53.72 63.14 35.68 56.50 39.11 55.74 52.42 51.57 
80 Netherlands 2009 95.28 88.51 84.91 90.53 92.90 93.23 91.35 93.78 
81 Norway 2006 81.16 70.67 79.65 83.91 91.99 88.88 82.87 85.24 
82 Nepal 2008 11.40 31.69 25.16 37.96 3.35 68.10 34.85 34.44 
83 New_Zealand 2013 72.83 85.72 78.84 89.57 50.42 80.03 77.41 78.48 
84 Pakistan 2014 33.87 45.27 19.22 48.01 32.32 87.30 51.02 48.64 
85 Panama 2006 91.07 65.78 50.23 73.96 47.74 56.13 64.69 65.63 
86 Peru 2006 66.78 67.15 32.70 54.46 37.01 84.09 62.39 62.50 
87 Philippines 2014 58.47 49.32 24.22 54.23 41.28 82.83 56.84 55.98 
88 Poland 2011 72.22 68.03 56.29 91.86 87.36 89.58 78.67 76.61 
89 Portugal 2013 79.89 82.09 68.63 91.19 89.70 88.98 84.05 83.54 
90 Paraguay 2008 53.18 57.92 36.26 60.83 37.09 75.13 57.14 56.32 
91 Romania 2006 60.44 60.73 44.18 78.72 38.69 89.91 66.50 64.99 
92 Rwanda 2006 19.54 34.11 23.81 38.03 4.27 60.31 34.49 34.22 
93 Saudi_Arabia 2006 52.82 76.19 70.24 69.12 82.06 57.24 65.22 66.57 
94 Senegal 2006 40.99 38.14 40.60 58.22 4.09 86.13 50.65 51.75 
95 Singapore 2014 99.01 96.53 93.20 85.75 96.53 54.77 83.64 87.04 
96 Sierra_Leone 2009 30.15 41.28 19.63 33.56 3.22 61.16 36.20 36.81 
97 El_Salvador 2011 57.17 63.11 35.53 66.64 41.19 78.63 60.89 59.25 
98 Sweden 2013 85.48 75.35 81.30 81.02 93.46 94.65 86.05 89.13 
99 Swaziland 2007 63.20 36.36 61.97 54.71 6.37 33.68 42.40 47.23 
100 Syr_Arab_Rep 2007 49.06 38.95 43.38 63.66 1.00 54.93 44.26 45.17 
101 Chad 2011 50.22 28.12 19.94 36.74 2.91 58.55 37.11 39.14 
102 Togo 2008 53.50 37.49 28.74 54.91 3.53 71.19 46.93 47.25 
103 Thailand 2008 74.06 55.41 39.67 68.67 37.94 78.48 62.87 62.95 
104 Trinid&Tobago 2007 79.71 71.95 61.64 66.92 5.76 47.01 56.82 59.84 
105 Tunisia 2011 68.94 42.49 40.06 78.34 2.48 83.92 58.35 58.22 
106 Turkey 2006 46.77 69.54 40.93 72.69 78.12 89.96 69.07 65.92 
107 Tanzania 2006 27.06 50.59 17.16 33.54 2.61 55.17 35.78 34.91 
108 Uganda 2006 35.99 52.16 24.19 35.24 3.53 67.77 42.31 42.80 
109 Uruguay 2012 60.28 67.75 52.98 69.97 42.11 84.09 66.43 66.74 
110 U.S.A. 2009 59.05 78.48 66.91 81.46 91.77 91.43 79.14 78.47 
111 Venezuela_RB 2010 40.82 37.04 38.46 70.34 40.30 66.51 50.75 48.92 
112 Vietnam 2006 70.58 39.35 17.13 59.33 3.04 50.33 43.21 42.59 
113 Yemen_Rep. 2014 35.99 54.18 26.38 44.10 1.12 65.01 42.99 42.64 
114 South_Africa 2011 67.26 63.98 39.51 61.09 40.86 86.20 64.64 64.93 
115 Congo_D_Rep. 2006 19.87 28.69 8.76 34.02 1.00 44.96 26.11 24.95 
116 Zambia 2012 50.36 55.83 16.51 43.66 3.78 73.04 47.36 46.41 
E1, E2, S1, S2, S3, P and KOF are for the Year-L when the overall index AEMC attained minimum (Gmin) during 2006-2014 
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Table-3.1. Regime-Wise Mean Score of Globalization in Different Dimensions 
[Based on Maximum Values Gmin Attained during 2006-2014] 
Regimes 
Economic, Social and Political Sub-Indices of Globalizations Overall Globalization 
E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P KOF AEMC 
Full Democracy 82.4281 82.6881 76.6950 87.3912 81.5250 86.5373 83.4765 84.7481 
Flawed Democracy 69.7478 66.4475 45.0997 67.1508 43.9486 77.3778 64.8567 65.0561 
Hybrid Regime 57.9055 53.4373 36.8527 55.4082 23.4155 71.4786 53.8541 54.5705 
Authoritarian 60.4478 49.8681 32.3872 54.7928 17.8891 69.0788 51.7016 52.3234 
. 
Table-3.2. Regime-Wise Mean Score of Globalization in Different Dimensions 
[Based on Minimum Values Attained during 2006-2014] 
Regimes 
Economic, Social and Political Sub-Indices of Globalizations Overall Globalization 
E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P KOF AEMC 
Full Democracy 78.0712 76.7454 76.0904 86.8815 78.0554 84.5658 80.5685 81.8246 
Flawed Democracy 61.5794 60.9519 43.1203 66.7581 36.8533 73.6744 60.2900 60.0739 
Hybrid Regime 47.6191 49.6445 34.3482 54.5545 21.3032 67.6200 49.6641 49.6182 
Authoritarian 47.0003 43.6813 31.1909 51.4350 15.5306 62.9647 45.6419 45.9247 
 
In Table-3.1 we present regime-wise mean scores of globalization (for different dimensions as well 
as overall globalization) on the optimistic side (maximum globalization during 2006-2014), while in 
Table-3.2 we present regime-wise mean scores of globalization on the pessimistic side (minimum 
globalization during 2006-2014). Fig-1.1 and Fig-1.2 present the same information graphically. We 
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Fig-1.1. Regime-Wise Mean Score of Globalization in Different 
Dimensions [Based on Maximum Values Attained during 2006-2014]
Full Democracy Flawed Democracy Hybrid Regime Authoritarian
15 
 
observe that as one moves away from Full Democracy to an Authoritarian Regime the expected 
extent (mean) of globalization in all dimensions (as well as overall globalization) declines.  
 
Canonical correlation of democracy and globalization: To dive deeper into the relationship between 
democracy and globalization, we have carried out representation constrained canonical correlation 
analysis of globalization sub-indices (E1 through P) with democracy sub-indices (EPP through CVL). 
Representation constrained canonical correlation analysis (Mishra, 2009) is slightly different from 
the classical correlation analysis. If CCD=Xw is a composite index or score vector of democracy (while 
X=[EPP,FOG,PPN,PCL,CVL] ;  w=weight vector) and CCG=Yv is a composite index or score vector of 
globalization (while Y=[E1,E2,S1,S2,S3,P]; v=weight vector), then the classical canonical correlation 
analysis maximized the squared Pearson’s correlation, 
2
,CCGCCDr , between CCD and CCG irrespective 
of how CCD represents the individual components of X and CCG represents the individual 
components of Y. The representation constrained canonical correlation strikes a balance between 
2
,CCGCCDr  and representation of X by CCD (
2
, XCCDr ) and Y by CCG (
2
,YCCGr ). Therefore, representation 
constrained canonical correlation analysis is a hybrid of the Classical Canonical Correlation Analysis 
and the Principal Component Analysis (Mishra, 2009; Hwang et al., 2013; Choi et al., 2017).  
In Table-4.1 we present the canonical correlation scores obtained by different countries for 
democracy (CCD) in 2006 and those for globalization (CCG) during 2006-2014. The measures of 
democracy in 2006 have been correlated with the optimistic level (for Gmax) of globalization during 
2006-2014 (left panel) as well as the pessimistic level (for Gmin) of globalization during 2006-2014 
(right panel). Table-4.2 represents a similar picture as Table-4.1, except that CCD (democracy 
measures) is for the year 2016.  
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Fig-1.2. Regime-Wise Mean Score of Globalization in Different 
Dimensions [Based on Minimum Values Attained during 2006-2014]
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Table-4.1. Canonical Correlation Analysis of Democracy and Globalization in Different Countries for OSC-2006   
SL Country 
Optimistic (For Gmax during 2006-2014) Pessimistic (For Gmin during 2006-2014)  
CCD CCG OSC KOF AEMC CCD CCG OSC KOF AEMC 
1 Albania 0.7746 0.9761 5.91 61.60 61.61 0.7374 0.8294 5.91 51.18 50.86 
2 Argentina 0.8658 0.8487 6.63 59.95 59.19 0.8247 0.8658 6.63 57.89 57.09 
3 Australia 1.2790 1.4135 9.09 83.80 84.03 1.2194 1.4315 9.09 81.97 82.24 
4 Austria 1.2273 1.6046 8.69 91.87 93.95 1.1686 1.5825 8.69 89.09 91.36 
5 Azerbaijan 0.4031 0.8148 3.31 57.02 54.69 0.3887 0.8715 3.31 55.35 52.78 
6 Burundi 0.6208 0.3075 4.51 35.04 34.79 0.5894 0.2638 4.51 27.89 26.92 
7 Belgium 1.1058 1.6020 8.15 92.41 93.75 1.0554 1.6017 8.15 90.70 92.32 
8 Benin 0.8415 0.5797 6.16 46.67 48.99 0.8002 0.5301 6.16 40.22 41.61 
9 Burkina_Faso 0.4926 0.6128 3.72 48.69 49.12 0.4666 0.5661 3.72 40.68 41.27 
10 Bulgaria 0.9162 1.2334 7.10 76.98 76.34 0.8736 1.2072 7.10 70.59 69.36 
11 Bolivia 0.7349 0.7805 5.98 54.42 56.38 0.7018 0.8137 5.98 52.76 53.62 
12 Brazil 0.9588 0.8802 7.38 61.40 58.16 0.9152 0.9005 7.38 59.38 55.59 
13 Bhutan 0.3379 0.5531 2.62 43.58 47.07 0.3292 0.4627 2.62 33.12 35.44 
14 Botswana 1.0241 0.8330 7.60 55.50 60.64 0.9763 0.7118 7.60 45.21 49.05 
15 C._Afr_Rep 0.1523 0.3311 1.61 36.34 37.27 0.1505 0.3399 1.61 32.80 34.45 
16 Canada 1.2856 1.4945 9.07 87.15 87.51 1.2280 1.5141 9.07 85.60 86.39 
17 Switzerland 1.2749 1.5203 9.02 88.79 93.18 1.2160 1.5180 9.02 86.84 91.37 
18 Chile 1.0479 1.2221 7.89 74.31 72.77 1.0011 1.1972 7.89 71.11 69.54 
19 China 0.4549 0.8700 2.97 62.02 56.85 0.4329 0.8907 2.97 60.42 55.12 
20 Cote_d'Ivoire 0.4794 0.6602 3.38 49.83 53.08 0.4599 0.6789 3.38 47.92 48.82 
21 Cameroon 0.4655 0.5041 3.27 44.20 42.75 0.4472 0.5606 3.27 42.67 40.16 
22 Congo_Rep. 0.3153 0.6923 2.76 51.83 57.31 0.2932 0.5886 2.76 42.91 47.78 
23 Colombia 0.7966 0.8686 6.40 60.15 58.23 0.7608 0.8434 6.40 56.48 54.44 
24 Costa_Rica 1.0869 0.9906 8.04 63.66 63.45 1.0369 1.0328 8.04 62.05 61.03 
25 Cyprus 1.0176 1.5060 7.60 87.32 89.36 0.9715 1.3909 7.60 76.11 78.44 
26 Germany 1.2456 1.4795 8.82 86.48 87.44 1.1869 1.4588 8.82 83.41 85.16 
27 Denmark 1.3613 1.5696 9.52 90.01 91.90 1.2975 1.5450 9.52 86.99 88.85 
28 Domin_Rep 0.7765 0.9941 6.13 66.45 67.20 0.7366 0.8752 6.13 55.00 55.44 
29 Algeria 0.4327 0.7587 3.17 54.00 53.32 0.4112 0.6324 3.17 43.47 42.36 
30 Ecuador 0.6793 0.7951 5.64 57.39 56.77 0.6511 0.7599 5.64 52.78 51.64 
31 Egypt 0.5632 0.8841 3.90 63.10 59.62 0.5342 0.8449 3.90 56.99 53.67 
32 Spain 1.1677 1.4643 8.34 85.92 86.71 1.1111 1.4603 8.34 83.68 84.60 
33 Ethiopia 0.6625 0.3899 4.72 39.33 39.87 0.6305 0.3983 4.72 36.82 37.47 
34 Finland 1.3038 1.4955 9.25 87.22 87.36 1.2430 1.5071 9.25 85.08 85.04 
35 Fiji 0.7259 0.7562 5.66 57.56 61.30 0.6959 0.7625 5.66 53.75 57.81 
36 France 1.1073 1.5287 8.07 88.23 89.36 1.0548 1.5235 8.07 86.09 87.32 
37 Gabon 0.3941 0.7987 2.72 55.96 59.46 0.3755 0.7084 2.72 47.92 51.79 
38 U.K. 1.1138 1.5469 8.08 89.06 89.91 1.0596 1.5503 8.08 87.26 88.15 
39 Ghana 0.6720 0.7547 5.35 54.17 55.67 0.6381 0.7380 5.35 49.19 50.64 
40 Guinea 0.2456 0.5161 2.02 44.40 46.82 0.2348 0.4965 2.02 39.38 40.45 
41 Gambia  0.6047 0.7210 4.39 51.78 54.92 0.5736 0.7779 4.39 50.18 51.12 
42 Greece 1.1147 1.4031 8.13 82.59 83.44 1.0625 1.3960 8.13 79.82 80.21 
43 Guatemala 0.7495 0.8907 6.07 60.42 57.71 0.7134 0.9173 6.07 58.89 56.59 
44 Guyana 0.7703 0.8084 6.15 56.44 59.99 0.7358 0.7531 6.15 47.60 49.78 
45 Honduras 0.8026 0.9046 6.25 61.42 60.57 0.7635 0.9122 6.25 58.38 57.05 
46 Haiti 0.4763 0.4717 4.19 39.36 38.47 0.4580 0.5433 4.19 38.81 34.53 
47 Hungary 1.0066 1.4810 7.53 86.99 87.02 0.9587 1.5092 7.53 86.05 86.30 
48 Indonesia 0.8712 0.8677 6.41 59.65 57.96 0.8305 0.8629 6.41 56.64 54.53 
49 India 1.0072 0.6658 7.68 52.38 50.87 0.9624 0.6865 7.68 50.22 47.98 
50 Ireland 1.2715 1.6213 9.01 92.15 95.20 1.2132 1.5885 9.01 85.93 89.89 
51 Iceland 1.3990 1.2647 9.71 77.86 81.39 1.3332 1.1542 9.71 67.32 71.77 
52 Israel 1.0136 1.2975 7.28 78.15 80.79 0.9575 1.2399 7.28 72.46 75.13 
53 Italy 1.0720 1.4004 7.73 82.85 83.57 1.0193 1.3999 7.73 80.94 81.77 
54 Jamaica 0.9716 1.0077 7.34 62.72 66.57 0.9267 0.9642 7.34 58.43 62.05 
55 Jordan 0.5282 1.1230 3.92 70.31 73.94 0.5041 1.1252 3.92 67.93 69.18 
56 Japan 1.1418 1.1331 8.15 72.26 68.81 1.0869 1.1151 8.15 69.25 65.61 
57 Kenya 0.7132 0.5773 5.08 46.46 45.80 0.6802 0.6100 5.08 45.16 42.55 
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58 Cambodia 0.6188 0.6878 4.77 50.69 54.22 0.5869 0.6840 4.77 46.83 49.02 
59 South_Korea  1.0849 1.0354 7.88 67.03 66.05 1.0307 1.0417 7.88 63.92 61.36 
60 Kuwait 0.4295 1.1308 3.09 70.76 72.18 0.4100 1.1020 3.09 66.44 67.03 
61 Lebanon 0.7752 1.1472 5.82 70.50 74.20 0.7338 1.1230 5.82 65.70 67.36 
62 Lesotho 0.8638 0.5626 6.48 45.94 48.77 0.8217 0.4429 6.48 35.69 36.96 
63 Luxembourg 1.2824 1.5214 9.10 85.62 89.59 1.2222 1.4866 9.10 80.05 83.89 
64 Morocco 0.5289 1.0043 3.90 65.95 64.33 0.5021 0.8662 3.90 57.63 56.51 
65 Moldova 0.8321 0.9816 6.50 64.04 61.70 0.7917 1.0004 6.50 61.39 58.36 
66 Madagascar 0.8180 0.4773 5.82 42.90 42.98 0.7777 0.4861 5.82 39.71 39.25 
67 Mexico 0.8558 0.9403 6.67 62.29 61.61 0.8170 0.9450 6.67 59.27 57.99 
68 Mali 0.7765 0.5563 5.99 46.07 46.72 0.7358 0.5721 5.99 43.06 44.06 
69 Malta 1.1786 1.2968 8.39 76.16 78.24 1.1233 1.3595 8.39 74.50 76.39 
70 Myanmar 0.2561 0.4220 1.77 39.03 38.40 0.2402 0.3583 1.77 31.86 32.04 
71 Montenegro 0.8530 1.0945 6.57 65.48 66.92 0.8094 1.0372 6.57 57.31 56.97 
72 Mongolia 0.8490 0.8069 6.60 56.91 55.63 0.8072 0.7220 6.60 48.72 46.41 
73 Mauritania 0.3808 0.7054 3.12 51.45 52.55 0.3690 0.5540 3.12 40.79 43.65 
74 Mauritius 1.1108 1.0656 8.04 66.61 66.81 1.0588 1.0505 8.04 61.85 60.47 
75 Malawi 0.6316 0.5581 4.97 45.40 46.09 0.6019 0.5237 4.97 39.76 40.16 
76 Malaysia 0.8405 1.2848 5.98 79.12 81.07 0.7986 1.3119 5.98 78.14 79.14 
77 Niger 0.4035 0.6192 3.54 47.92 50.86 0.3839 0.4977 3.54 38.88 41.05 
78 Nigeria 0.4584 0.7116 3.52 54.36 52.53 0.4376 0.7151 3.52 50.24 48.17 
79 Nicaragua 0.6883 0.7379 5.68 53.99 53.56 0.6560 0.8015 5.68 52.42 51.57 
80 Netherlands 1.3996 1.6307 9.66 92.84 95.24 1.3349 1.6499 9.66 91.35 93.78 
81 Norway 1.3452 1.4254 9.55 84.48 86.83 1.2854 1.4429 9.55 82.87 85.24 
82 Nepal 0.4878 0.3943 3.42 38.18 36.70 0.4744 0.4035 3.42 34.85 34.44 
83 New_Zealand 1.2565 1.3690 9.01 79.17 80.12 1.1990 1.3995 9.01 77.41 78.48 
84 Pakistan 0.4849 0.6549 3.92 51.83 51.16 0.4624 0.7048 3.92 51.02 48.64 
85 Panama 0.9599 1.0566 7.35 67.70 67.56 0.9152 1.0683 7.35 64.69 65.63 
86 Peru 0.7759 1.0330 6.11 66.14 65.24 0.7381 0.9937 6.11 62.39 62.50 
87 Philippines 0.7959 0.8145 6.48 58.39 59.19 0.7617 0.8386 6.48 56.84 55.98 
88 Poland 0.9540 1.3383 7.30 81.32 79.32 0.9100 1.3318 7.30 78.67 76.61 
89 Portugal 1.1172 1.5115 8.16 87.61 88.21 1.0649 1.4770 8.16 84.05 83.54 
90 Paraguay 0.7785 0.8669 6.16 60.13 59.39 0.7454 0.8864 6.16 57.14 56.32 
91 Romania 0.9081 1.2433 7.06 76.51 73.36 0.8657 1.0929 7.06 66.50 64.99 
92 Rwanda 0.5013 0.5692 3.82 45.56 43.83 0.4808 0.3996 3.82 34.49 34.22 
93 Saudi_Arabia 0.2533 1.0840 1.92 68.43 69.75 0.2422 1.1125 1.92 65.22 66.57 
94 Senegal 0.6989 0.7559 5.37 54.64 54.59 0.6623 0.7566 5.37 50.65 51.75 
95 Singapore 0.8371 1.5438 5.89 88.27 91.52 0.8021 1.5256 5.89 83.64 87.04 
96 Sierra_Leone 0.4167 0.5642 3.57 45.90 48.29 0.3940 0.4458 3.57 36.20 36.81 
97 El_Salvador 0.7687 0.9849 6.22 63.79 64.02 0.7321 0.9676 6.22 60.89 59.25 
98 Sweden 1.4171 1.5470 9.88 89.41 91.73 1.3524 1.5115 9.88 86.05 89.13 
99 Swaziland 0.3514 0.6192 2.93 47.48 51.92 0.3417 0.6222 2.93 42.40 47.23 
100 Syr_Arab_Rep 0.3698 0.6721 2.36 48.93 50.02 0.3490 0.6486 2.36 44.26 45.17 
101 Chad 0.2128 0.3724 1.65 38.37 41.70 0.2040 0.4417 1.65 37.11 39.14 
102 Togo 0.2485 0.7210 1.75 53.70 54.25 0.2344 0.6608 1.75 46.93 47.25 
103 Thailand 0.7749 1.0986 5.67 72.06 71.71 0.7432 1.0008 5.67 62.87 62.95 
104 Trinid&Tobago 0.9458 0.9655 7.18 63.09 65.62 0.9015 0.9718 7.18 56.82 59.84 
105 Tunisia 0.4657 0.8987 3.06 60.45 60.63 0.4468 0.9225 3.06 58.35 58.22 
106 Turkey 0.7074 1.1101 5.70 71.33 69.88 0.6723 1.1215 5.70 69.07 65.92 
107 Tanzania 0.6923 0.3870 5.18 37.71 37.42 0.6575 0.4426 5.18 35.78 34.91 
108 Uganda 0.7095 0.5661 5.14 45.48 45.69 0.6798 0.5805 5.14 42.31 42.80 
109 Uruguay 1.0645 1.0544 7.96 67.23 68.14 1.0146 1.1097 7.96 66.43 66.74 
110 U.S.A. 1.1680 1.3734 8.22 81.80 81.15 1.1119 1.3657 8.22 79.14 78.47 
111 Venezuela_RB 0.7026 0.7682 5.42 56.17 55.45 0.6675 0.7335 5.42 50.75 48.92 
112 Vietnam 0.3752 0.7605 2.75 56.69 54.98 0.3582 0.5886 2.75 43.21 42.59 
113 Yemen_Rep. 0.3829 0.5997 2.98 46.51 46.66 0.3625 0.6098 2.98 42.99 42.64 
114 South_Africa 1.0840 1.0248 7.91 66.72 67.54 1.0352 1.0427 7.91 64.64 64.93 
115 Congo_D_Rep. 0.3153 0.4504 2.76 41.67 42.31 0.2932 0.2168 2.76 26.11 24.95 
116 Zambia 0.7097 0.7416 5.25 52.96 54.04 0.6776 0.6740 5.25 47.36 46.41 
. 
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Table-4.2. Canonical Correlation Analysis of Democracy and Globalization in Different Countries for OSC-2016   
SL Country 
Optimistic (for Gmax during 2006-2014) Pessimistic (for Gmin during 2006-2014) 
CCD CCG OSC KOF AEMC CCD CCG OSC KOF AEMC 
1 Albania 0.7271 1.0223 5.91 61.60 61.61 0.7578 0.9931 5.91 51.18 50.86 
2 Argentina 0.8128 0.8888 6.96 59.95 59.19 0.8470 0.8634 6.96 57.89 57.09 
3 Australia 1.2006 1.4803 9.01 83.80 84.03 1.2512 1.4380 9.01 81.97 82.24 
4 Austria 1.1521 1.6804 8.41 91.87 93.95 1.2006 1.6324 8.41 89.09 91.36 
5 Azerbaijan 0.3784 0.8533 2.65 57.02 54.69 0.3944 0.8289 2.65 55.35 52.78 
6 Burundi 0.5827 0.3220 2.40 35.04 34.79 0.6073 0.3128 2.40 27.89 26.92 
7 Belgium 1.0380 1.6777 7.77 92.41 93.75 1.0818 1.6298 7.77 90.70 92.32 
8 Benin 0.7899 0.6071 5.67 46.67 48.99 0.8232 0.5898 5.67 40.22 41.61 
9 Burkina_Faso 0.4624 0.6417 4.70 48.69 49.12 0.4819 0.6234 4.70 40.68 41.27 
10 Bulgaria 0.8600 1.2916 7.01 76.98 76.34 0.8963 1.2547 7.01 70.59 69.36 
11 Bolivia 0.6899 0.8174 5.63 54.42 56.38 0.7190 0.7940 5.63 52.76 53.62 
12 Brazil 0.9000 0.9218 6.90 61.40 58.16 0.9380 0.8955 6.90 59.38 55.59 
13 Bhutan 0.3171 0.5793 4.93 43.58 47.07 0.3305 0.5627 4.93 33.12 35.44 
14 Botswana 0.9613 0.8724 7.87 55.50 60.64 1.0018 0.8475 7.87 45.21 49.05 
15 C._Afr_Rep 0.1430 0.3468 1.61 36.34 37.27 0.1490 0.3369 1.61 32.80 34.45 
16 Canada 1.2068 1.5651 9.15 87.15 87.51 1.2577 1.5204 9.15 85.60 86.39 
17 Switzerland 1.1968 1.5921 9.09 88.79 93.18 1.2472 1.5467 9.09 86.84 91.37 
18 Chile 0.9837 1.2798 7.78 74.31 72.77 1.0252 1.2432 7.78 71.11 69.54 
19 China 0.4270 0.9110 3.14 62.02 56.85 0.4450 0.8850 3.14 60.42 55.12 
20 Cote_d'Ivoire 0.4500 0.6914 3.81 49.83 53.08 0.4690 0.6716 3.81 47.92 48.82 
21 Cameroon 0.4369 0.5279 3.46 44.20 42.75 0.4554 0.5128 3.46 42.67 40.16 
22 Congo_Rep. 0.2960 0.7249 2.91 51.83 57.31 0.3085 0.7043 2.91 42.91 47.78 
23 Colombia 0.7477 0.9096 6.67 60.15 58.23 0.7793 0.8836 6.67 56.48 54.44 
24 Costa_Rica 1.0203 1.0374 7.88 63.66 63.45 1.0633 1.0078 7.88 62.05 61.03 
25 Cyprus 0.9552 1.5771 7.65 87.32 89.36 0.9955 1.5321 7.65 76.11 78.44 
26 Germany 1.1692 1.5494 8.63 86.48 87.44 1.2185 1.5052 8.63 83.41 85.16 
27 Denmark 1.2778 1.6437 9.20 90.01 91.90 1.3317 1.5968 9.20 86.99 88.85 
28 Domin_Rep 0.7289 1.0411 6.67 66.45 67.20 0.7596 1.0114 6.67 55.00 55.44 
29 Algeria 0.4062 0.7946 3.56 54.00 53.32 0.4233 0.7719 3.56 43.47 42.36 
30 Ecuador 0.6377 0.8326 5.81 57.39 56.77 0.6646 0.8089 5.81 52.78 51.64 
31 Egypt 0.5287 0.9258 3.31 63.10 59.62 0.5510 0.8994 3.31 56.99 53.67 
32 Spain 1.0961 1.5334 8.30 85.92 86.71 1.1423 1.4896 8.30 83.68 84.60 
33 Ethiopia 0.6218 0.4083 3.60 39.33 39.87 0.6481 0.3967 3.60 36.82 37.47 
34 Finland 1.2238 1.5661 9.03 87.22 87.36 1.2755 1.5214 9.03 85.08 85.04 
35 Fiji 0.6814 0.7919 5.64 57.56 61.30 0.7102 0.7693 5.64 53.75 57.81 
36 France 1.0394 1.6009 7.92 88.23 89.36 1.0833 1.5552 7.92 86.09 87.32 
37 Gabon 0.3699 0.8364 3.74 55.96 59.46 0.3855 0.8125 3.74 47.92 51.79 
38 U.K. 1.0455 1.6200 8.36 89.06 89.91 1.0896 1.5737 8.36 87.26 88.15 
39 Ghana 0.6308 0.7903 6.75 54.17 55.67 0.6574 0.7677 6.75 49.19 50.64 
40 Guinea 0.2306 0.5405 3.14 44.40 46.82 0.2403 0.5251 3.14 39.38 40.45 
41 Gambia  0.5676 0.7551 2.91 51.78 54.92 0.5915 0.7335 2.91 50.18 51.12 
42 Greece 1.0464 1.4694 7.23 82.59 83.44 1.0905 1.4274 7.23 79.82 80.21 
43 Guatemala 0.7036 0.9328 5.92 60.42 57.71 0.7333 0.9062 5.92 58.89 56.59 
44 Guyana 0.7230 0.8465 6.25 56.44 59.99 0.7535 0.8224 6.25 47.60 49.78 
45 Honduras 0.7534 0.9473 5.92 61.42 60.57 0.7851 0.9202 5.92 58.38 57.05 
46 Haiti 0.4471 0.4940 4.02 39.36 38.47 0.4659 0.4799 4.02 38.81 34.53 
47 Hungary 0.9449 1.5510 6.72 86.99 87.02 0.9847 1.5067 6.72 86.05 86.30 
48 Indonesia 0.8178 0.9087 6.97 59.65 57.96 0.8523 0.8827 6.97 56.64 54.53 
49 India 0.9455 0.6972 7.81 52.38 50.87 0.9853 0.6773 7.81 50.22 47.98 
50 Ireland 1.1935 1.6978 9.15 92.15 95.20 1.2439 1.6494 9.15 85.93 89.89 
51 Iceland 1.3132 1.3244 9.50 77.86 81.39 1.3686 1.2866 9.50 67.32 71.77 
52 Israel 0.9515 1.3588 7.85 78.15 80.79 0.9916 1.3200 7.85 72.46 75.13 
53 Italy 1.0062 1.4666 7.98 82.85 83.57 1.0487 1.4247 7.98 80.94 81.77 
54 Jamaica 0.9121 1.0553 7.39 62.72 66.57 0.9505 1.0252 7.39 58.43 62.05 
55 Jordan 0.4958 1.1760 3.96 70.31 73.94 0.5167 1.1425 3.96 67.93 69.18 
56 Japan 1.0718 1.1865 7.99 72.26 68.81 1.1170 1.1527 7.99 69.25 65.61 
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57 Kenya 0.6695 0.6046 5.33 46.46 45.80 0.6977 0.5873 5.33 45.16 42.55 
58 Cambodia 0.5809 0.7203 4.27 50.69 54.22 0.6054 0.6997 4.27 46.83 49.02 
59 South_Korea  1.0184 1.0843 7.92 67.03 66.05 1.0613 1.0533 7.92 63.92 61.36 
60 Kuwait 0.4031 1.1843 3.85 70.76 72.18 0.4201 1.1504 3.85 66.44 67.03 
61 Lebanon 0.7277 1.2014 4.86 70.50 74.20 0.7583 1.1671 4.86 65.70 67.36 
62 Lesotho 0.8108 0.5891 6.59 45.94 48.77 0.8450 0.5723 6.59 35.69 36.96 
63 Luxembourg 1.2038 1.5933 8.81 85.62 89.59 1.2545 1.5478 8.81 80.05 83.89 
64 Morocco 0.4964 1.0517 4.77 65.95 64.33 0.5174 1.0217 4.77 57.63 56.51 
65 Moldova 0.7811 1.0280 6.01 64.04 61.70 0.8140 0.9986 6.01 61.39 58.36 
66 Madagascar 0.7678 0.4998 5.07 42.90 42.98 0.8002 0.4856 5.07 39.71 39.25 
67 Mexico 0.8033 0.9847 6.47 62.29 61.61 0.8372 0.9566 6.47 59.27 57.99 
68 Mali 0.7290 0.5826 5.70 46.07 46.72 0.7597 0.5660 5.70 43.06 44.06 
69 Malta 1.1064 1.3581 8.39 76.16 78.24 1.1530 1.3193 8.39 74.50 76.39 
70 Myanmar 0.2403 0.4419 4.20 39.03 38.40 0.2505 0.4293 4.20 31.86 32.04 
71 Montenegro 0.8007 1.1463 5.72 65.48 66.92 0.8344 1.1135 5.72 57.31 56.97 
72 Mongolia 0.7970 0.8451 6.62 56.91 55.63 0.8306 0.8209 6.62 48.72 46.41 
73 Mauritania 0.3575 0.7388 3.96 51.45 52.55 0.3726 0.7177 3.96 40.79 43.65 
74 Mauritius 1.0427 1.1160 8.28 66.61 66.81 1.0866 1.0841 8.28 61.85 60.47 
75 Malawi 0.5928 0.5845 5.55 45.40 46.09 0.6178 0.5678 5.55 39.76 40.16 
76 Malaysia 0.7890 1.3454 6.54 79.12 81.07 0.8222 1.3070 6.54 78.14 79.14 
77 Niger 0.3788 0.6484 3.96 47.92 50.86 0.3947 0.6299 3.96 38.88 41.05 
78 Nigeria 0.4302 0.7452 4.50 54.36 52.53 0.4484 0.7240 4.50 50.24 48.17 
79 Nicaragua 0.6461 0.7727 4.81 53.99 53.56 0.6733 0.7507 4.81 52.42 51.57 
80 Netherlands 1.3137 1.7077 8.80 92.84 95.24 1.3692 1.6590 8.80 91.35 93.78 
81 Norway 1.2627 1.4928 9.93 84.48 86.83 1.3160 1.4502 9.93 82.87 85.24 
82 Nepal 0.4578 0.4129 4.86 38.18 36.70 0.4771 0.4011 4.86 34.85 34.44 
83 New_Zealand 1.1794 1.4338 9.26 79.17 80.12 1.2292 1.3928 9.26 77.41 78.48 
84 Pakistan 0.4552 0.6858 4.33 51.83 51.16 0.4744 0.6662 4.33 51.02 48.64 
85 Panama 0.9011 1.1065 7.13 67.70 67.56 0.9390 1.0750 7.13 64.69 65.63 
86 Peru 0.7283 1.0818 6.65 66.14 65.24 0.7590 1.0508 6.65 62.39 62.50 
87 Philippines 0.7471 0.8529 6.94 58.39 59.19 0.7786 0.8286 6.94 56.84 55.98 
88 Poland 0.8955 1.4015 6.83 81.32 79.32 0.9332 1.3615 6.83 78.67 76.61 
89 Portugal 1.0487 1.5829 7.86 87.61 88.21 1.0929 1.5377 7.86 84.05 83.54 
90 Paraguay 0.7308 0.9078 6.27 60.13 59.39 0.7616 0.8819 6.27 57.14 56.32 
91 Romania 0.8524 1.3020 6.62 76.51 73.36 0.8884 1.2649 6.62 66.50 64.99 
92 Rwanda 0.4705 0.5961 3.07 45.56 43.83 0.4903 0.5790 3.07 34.49 34.22 
93 Saudi_Arabia 0.2377 1.1352 1.93 68.43 69.75 0.2478 1.1028 1.93 65.22 66.57 
94 Senegal 0.6561 0.7916 6.21 54.64 54.59 0.6837 0.7690 6.21 50.65 51.75 
95 Singapore 0.7857 1.6168 6.38 88.27 91.52 0.8188 1.5706 6.38 83.64 87.04 
96 Sierra_Leone 0.3912 0.5909 4.55 45.90 48.29 0.4077 0.5740 4.55 36.20 36.81 
97 El_Salvador 0.7216 1.0314 6.64 63.79 64.02 0.7520 1.0019 6.64 60.89 59.25 
98 Sweden 1.3302 1.6201 9.39 89.41 91.73 1.3863 1.5738 9.39 86.05 89.13 
99 Swaziland 0.3299 0.6485 3.03 47.48 51.92 0.3438 0.6300 3.03 42.40 47.23 
100 Syr_Arab_Rep 0.3471 0.7039 1.43 48.93 50.02 0.3617 0.6838 1.43 44.26 45.17 
101 Chad 0.1998 0.3900 1.50 38.37 41.70 0.2082 0.3789 1.50 37.11 39.14 
102 Togo 0.2332 0.7551 3.32 53.70 54.25 0.2430 0.7335 3.32 46.93 47.25 
103 Thailand 0.7274 1.1505 4.92 72.06 71.71 0.7581 1.1176 4.92 62.87 62.95 
104 Trinid&Tobago 0.8878 1.0111 7.10 63.09 65.62 0.9253 0.9823 7.10 56.82 59.84 
105 Tunisia 0.4371 0.9411 6.40 60.45 60.63 0.4555 0.9143 6.40 58.35 58.22 
106 Turkey 0.6641 1.1625 5.04 71.33 69.88 0.6921 1.1294 5.04 69.07 65.92 
107 Tanzania 0.6499 0.4053 5.76 37.71 37.42 0.6773 0.3937 5.76 35.78 34.91 
108 Uganda 0.6660 0.5929 5.26 45.48 45.69 0.6941 0.5759 5.26 42.31 42.80 
109 Uruguay 0.9992 1.1042 8.17 67.23 68.14 1.0414 1.0726 8.17 66.43 66.74 
110 U.S.A. 1.0964 1.4383 7.98 81.80 81.15 1.1426 1.3972 7.98 79.14 78.47 
111 Venezuela_RB 0.6595 0.8044 4.68 56.17 55.45 0.6873 0.7815 4.68 50.75 48.92 
112 Vietnam 0.3522 0.7964 3.38 56.69 54.98 0.3671 0.7737 3.38 43.21 42.59 
113 Yemen_Rep. 0.3594 0.6281 2.07 46.51 46.66 0.3746 0.6101 2.07 42.99 42.64 
114 South_Africa 1.0176 1.0732 7.41 66.72 67.54 1.0605 1.0425 7.41 64.64 64.93 
115 Congo_D_Rep. 0.2960 0.4716 1.93 41.67 42.31 0.3085 0.4581 1.93 26.11 24.95 
116 Zambia 0.6662 0.7766 5.99 52.96 54.04 0.6943 0.7544 5.99 47.36 46.41 
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In Table-5.1 we present the weights assigned to different measures of democracy and also those of 
globalization in constructing CCD and CCG (reported in Table-4.1). It also reports the Pearson’s 
correlation of different measures of democracy (EPP through CVL) with CCD and the Pearson’s 
correlation of different measures of globalization (E1 through P) with CCG. The weights and 
correlations are presented for optimistic as well as pessimistic attainments of globalization during 
2006-2014. The representation correlation of democracy (Regime) for the optimistic globalization is 
0.8839 while that for the pessimistic globalization is 0.8838. This correlation measures how best the 
CCD represents its constituents (EPP through CVL).   The representation correlation of globalization 
for the optimistic globalization is 0.8053 while that for the pessimistic globalization is 0.7966. This 
correlation measures how best the CCG represents its constituents (E1 through P). For the optimistic 
globalization, the representation constrained canonical correlation between CCD and CCG is 0.7879. 
This correlation measures how CCD and CCG are vary together. The classical canonical correlation is 
0.8106. The representation constrained canonical correlation loses only slightly (is reduced from 
0.8106 to 0.7879) for a better representation of democracy measures by CCD and globalization 
measures by CCG. Similarly for pessimistic globalization as well, only a little is lost (0.7966 in place of 
0.0.81495) for a better representation.    
 
Table-5.1. Analysis of Canonical Correlation between Dimensions of Democracy/Regime and Extent of Globalization  
Globali-
zation 
Weights 
and 
Correlation 
Dimensions of Democracy/Regime-2006 Dimensions of Globalization 2006-2014 
EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P 
Gmax 
Weight 0.1779 0.3011 0.3383 0.3967 0.2334 0.3112 0.3746 0.3366 0.1932 0.1608 0.3711 
Correln 0.8738 0.9296 0.9168 0.7954 0.9038 0.6884 0.8717 0.8852 0.9201 0.8806 0.5857 
Gmin 
Weight 0.1469 0.2933 0.3294 0.3665 0.2442 0.2988 0.3924 0.3431 0.2212 0.1453 0.3987 
Correln 0.8723 0.9307 0.9165 0.7941 0.9055 0.7818 0.8651 0.8712 0.9157 0.8834 0.5716 
Gmax (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8839; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.8053; Canonical Correlation=0.7879(0.8106)  
Gmin (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8838; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.8148; Canonical Correlation=0.7966(0.81495) 
 
A similar analysis is presented in Table-5.2 while the democracy measures pertain to the year 2016. 
There, too, representation is high as well as canonical correlation between CCD and CCG is high. The 
loss of correlation for better representation is very small. All these results indicate that democracy 
and globalization are concordant with each other. A perusal of Table-5.1 and Table-5.2 also reveals 
that the correlation of Functioning of Government (FOG) bears strongest correlation with CCG and 
Flow of Information (S2) bears the strongest relationship with CCD. Political Participation (PPN) and 
Trans-border Personal Contacts (S1) are the second most important aspects that join democracy and 
globalization. The measure of Political dimension of globalization (P) is the weakest of all variables.  
 
It is fairly likely that democracy (as measured by EPP, FOG, PPN, PCL and CVL) in 2006 promotes 
globalization (as measured by E1, E2, S1, S2 and P) in the later years. However, it would be a little 
far-fetched to assert that globalization in 2006-2014 (or min/max values of the overall globalization) 
promoted democracy witnessed in 2016. The coefficient of response to change in democracy index 
to the change in globalization is -0.002, which is not different from zero. The scatter of change in 
democracy index to change in globalization index is presented in Fig-3.   
 
Table-5.2. Analysis of Canonical Correlation between Dimensions of Democracy/Regime and Extent of Globalization  
Globali-
zation 
Weights 
and 
Correlation 
Dimensions of Democracy/Regime-2016 Dimensions of Globalization 2006-2014 
EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P 
Gmax 
Weight 0.1671 0.2827 0.3175 0.3724 0.2191 0.3259 0.3923 0.3526 0.2024 0.1684 0.3886 
Correln 0.8738 0.9296 0.9168 0.7953 0.9038 0.6884 0.8717 0.8852 0.9201 0.8806 0.5857 
Gmin 
Weight 0.1740 0.2946 0.3310 0.3880 0.2283 0.3166 0.3810 0.3425 0.1966 0.1636 0.3775 
Correln 0.8738 0.9296 0.9168 0.7953 0.9038 0.6884 0.8717 0.8852 0.9201 0.8806 0.5857 
Gmax (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8839; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.8053; Canonical Correlation=0.7879(0.8106)  
Gmin (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8839; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.8053; Canonical Correlation=0.7879(0.81063) 
 
  
 
10. A closer analysis of Asian and African countries
the Lee thesis was that democracy and Asian values have 
especially in the East-Asian countries, democratic 
development, while authoritarian governments would do. 
countries. This conclusion appears to be supported if we 
indicators of democracy vis-à-vis the indicators of globalization during 2006
mean levels of indicators (continent
6.2 (pessimistic view of globalization). Asian countries perform poorly (vis
the measures of democracy and yet they have performed better than African countries.
 
Table-6.1. Mean Level of Indicators of Democracy and Globalization (Optimistic view) in Different Continents
 
OSC EPP FOG PPN 
Asia 3.15 2.88 1.75 3.06 
Africa 4.88 4.84 3.97 3.61 
Others 8.66 9.38 8.40 7.50 
Total 6.37 6.59 5.58 5.56 
. 
Table-6.2. Mean Level of Indicators of Democracy and Globalization (Pessimistic view) in Different Continents
 
OSC EPP FOG PPN 
Asia 3.15 2.88 1.75 3.06 
Africa 4.88 4.84 3.97 3.61 
Others 8.66 9.38 8.40 7.50 
Total 6.37 6.59 5.58 5.56 
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Fig-3. Response of Democracy Index to Changes in Extent of Globalization 
:  One of the arguments apparently supporting 
an inherent incompatibility and, therefore, 
governments would not succeed in fostering 
This might also be true for all Asian 
cursorily look at the mean levels of the 
-2014. We present such 
-wise) in Table-6.1 (optimistic view of globalization) and Table
-à-vis African countries) at 
PCL CVL E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P 
4.07 3.97 60.38 63.77 30.75 59.76 18.32 58.13
6.25 5.74 43.89 48.67 24.47 41.46 3.60 68.05
8.75 9.27 69.98 83.29 70.27 85.00 92.97 90.91
7.50 6.62 44.35 59.36 44.08 59.84 47.50 77.14
PCL CVL E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P 
4.07 3.97 47.98 56.09 32.64 61.53 17.82 60.26
6.25 5.74 37.21 45.50 16.74 39.53 3.97 55.01
8.75 9.27 63.73 78.25 70.35 83.63 92.34 90.93
7.50 6.62 41.56 56.83 41.94 58.43 47.96 64.20
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
-4 -2 0 2 4
Change in Democracy Index
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-
 
- 2006-2014 
KOF AEMC 
 51.77 50.68 
 44.00 44.42 
 82.80 82.59 
 58.42 57.97 
- 2006-2014 
KOF AEMC 
 49.17 47.71 
 37.63 36.67 
 80.56 80.36 
 53.52 52.70 
6 8
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However, it has been empirically observed that democratic states often earn fewer monopoly rents 
and produce a higher level of services than autocracies and, therefore, democracy has real and 
substantively important effects on the daily lives and well-being of individuals around the globe 
(Lake and Baum, 2001). It also causes growth and investment to rise (Rock, 2009). The imports of 
‘Asian Values’ and the Lee thesis go all against such facts. Furthermore, Sen (1997; 1999) has 
questioned the existence or prevalence of any such values (supporting authoritarianism and 
downplaying freedom, democratic intents, tolerance, etc.) that could be said to be characteristically 
Asian or shared by all Asian countries in common. ‘Asian values’, whatever they are, may have a role 
but it would be wrong to suggest that they are the determining factor in the outcomes. If a case 
could ever be made for ‘Asian values’, it would not be as a coherent, ahistorical, monolithic bloc 
(Takashi. and Newman, 1997; Barr, 2000). So much divergence in views calls for an empirical 
examination of the status of globalization (as a path to development) of Asian countries vis-à-vis the 
regime type. We must go beyond the averages and look into co-movement and correlation. In Table-
7 we present the findings of (representation constrained) canonical correlation analysis for 26 Asian 
countries included in our study. Eurasian countries (such as Azerbaijan, Turkey) are included in Asia 
since geographically they are more a part of Asia than Europe.  We find that the sub-indices of 
globalization and the sub-indices of democracy are highly correlated even if we take a pessimistic 
view of globalization attained during 2006-2014. 
 
Table-7. Canonical Correlation Analysis between Dimensions of Democracy/Regime and Extent of Globalization (Asia#) 
Globali-
zation 
Weights 
and 
Correlation 
Dimensions of Democracy/Regime-2006 Dimensions of Globalization 2006-2014 
EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P 
Gmax 
Weight 0.1834 0.3015 0.3725 0.3366 0.2085 0.3019 0.4197 0.2045 0.2032 0.0612 0.4752 
Correln 0.8986 0.8090 0.8810 0.6428 0.8446 0.6112 0.7991 0.7481 0.8524 0.8444 0.5162 
Gmin 
Weight 0.2241 0.3174 0.3897 0.3793 0.2590 0.2754 0.3818 0.2152 0.2271 0.0755 0.4012 
Correln 0.9032 0.8061 0.8784 0.6381 0.8530 0.7089 0.8287 0.7454 0.8661 0.8225 0.3919 
Gmax (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8152; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.7285; Canonical Correlation= 0.6386 (0.8612)  
Gmin (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8158; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.7273; Canonical Correlation=0.5880(0.7379) 
# : Includes 26 countries in Asia (and Eurasia). 
 
A similar analysis for 38 African countries (see Table-8) reveals that democracy supports 
globalization although the role of the political dimension of globalization (P) is faltering and exhibits 
a negative correlation, but only for the optimistic view of globalization. Thus, the political aspect of 
globalization is a drag on other dimensions of globalization in African countries. 
 
Table-8. Canonical Correlation Analysis between Dimensions of Democracy/Regime and Extent of Globalization (Africa#)  
Globali-
zation 
Weights 
and 
Correlation 
Dimensions of Democracy/Regime-2006 Dimensions of Globalization 2006-2014 
EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P 
Gmax 
Weight 0.2070 0.4038 0.2182 0.3151 0.3413 0.1999 0.4500 0.2890 0.1713 0.3280 -0.2606 
Correln 0.8491 0.9473 0.8198 0.6578 0.9064 0.6192 0.7462 0.8044 0.7481 0.5712 -0.2467 
Gmin 
Weight 0.1481 0.3115 0.2837 0.3194 0.3108 0.2706 0.5132 0.2714 0.2332 0.2969 0.2215 
Correln 0.8345 0.9408 0.8372 0.6787 0.8940 0.4636 0.7436 0.6703 0.8396 0.7565 0.3302 
Gmax (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8361; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.6226; Canonical Correlation=0.4396(0.7062)  
Gmin (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8371; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.6340; Canonical Correlation=0.5025(0.7120) 
#: Includes 38 countries in Africa. 
. 
Table-9. Canonical Correlation Analysis between Dimensions of Democracy/Regime and Extent of Globalization (Others)  
Globali-
zation 
Weights 
and 
Correlation 
Dimensions of Democracy/Regime-2006 Dimensions of Globalization 2006-2014 
EPP FOG PPN PCL CVL E1 E2 S1 S2 S3 P 
Gmax 
Weight 0.3241 0.1465 0.2229 0.4022 0.1970 0.3658 0.3337 0.3789 0.2676 0.2496 0.3171 
Correln 0.8360 0.9069 0.8722 0.9393 0.9004 0.7702 0.7620 0.8905 0.8979 0.8286 0.6578 
Gmin 
Weight 0.3549 0.1969 0.2508 0.4372 0.2497 0.3247 0.2843 0.4227 0.2356 0.1844 0.2539 
Correln 0.8349 0.9123 0.8688 0.9371 0.9051 0.8125 0.7369 0.8849 0.8759 0.8401 0.5958 
Gmax (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8910; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.8012; Canonical Correlation=0.8914(0.9159)  
Gmin (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8916; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.7910; Canonical Correlation=0.8933(0.9200) 
Others include 52 Non-Asian, Non-African and Non-Eurasian countries, i.e. the countries in Australia/Oceania, the Americas and Europe.  
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A similar type of analysis for other countries (in Australia/Oceania, Americas and Europe) suggests 
that the (representation constrained) canonical correlation between globalization and democracy is 
more than in Asia and Africa (Table-9). A summary of the coefficients of canonical correlation 
analysis is presented in Table-10. There is a clear indication that as we move from African countries 
to non-African and non-Asian countries (i.e. Australian/Oceanian, American and European 
countries), the concordance between political regime and globalization increases.   
 
Table-10. A Summary of Canonical Correlation Between Globalization and Democracy/Political Regime 
View of Globalization African countries (38) Asian Countries (26) Other Countries (52) All Countries (116) 
Optimistic (Gmax) 0.4396 0.6386 0.8914 0.7879 
Pessimistic (Gmin) 0.5025 0.5880 0.8933 0.7966 
 
11. Distribution of countries by regime type and globalization score: In Table-11 we present the 
countries classified according to the regime type and the overall globalization index (score). Of 116 
countries, 25 are full democracies and 34 are flawed democracies.  Full democracy countries have 
globalization score 60 and above. Flawed democracies mostly obtain globalization score 40 to 60, 
although Hungary and Italy are highly globalized while Lesotho is only poorly globalized.  
 
Table-11. Classification of countries according to Regime type and level of Globalization (GI=Overall Globalization Index) 
 GI 80 and above GI from 60 to <80 GI from 40 to <60 GI less than 40 
Democracy index (OSC) 
8 and above 
(Full Democracy) 
Australia, Austria,, 
Belgium, Canada, 
Switzerland, Germany ,                
Denmark, Spain, Finland                 
France, U.K.,  Greece, 
Ireland, Luxembourg,             
Netherlands, Norway,                 
Portugal, Sweden                 
(18 countries) 
Costa Rica, Iceland,                 
Japan, Malta, Mauritius,               
New_Zealand, U.S.A. 
(7 countries) 
Nil Nil 
Democracy index (OSC) 
6 to < 8 
(Flawed Democracy) 
Hungary, Italy 
(2 countries) 
Bulgaria, Chile, Cyprus,                  
Israel, Jamaica, South 
Korea, Panama, Peru,                    
Poland, Romania, 
Uruguay, South Africa           
(12 countries) 
Argentina, Benin, Brazil,                  
Botswana, Colombia,                
Dominic Republic, 
Guatemala,  Guyana,      
Honduras, Indonesia,              
India, Moldova,            
Mexico, Montenegro, 
Mongolia, Philippines,            
Paraguay, El_Salvador,           
Trinidad &Tobago          
(19 countries) 
Lesotho   
(1 country) 
Democracy index (OSC) 
4 to < 6 
(Hybrid Regime) 
Singapore 
(1 country) 
Lebanon, Malaysia,                 
Thailand, Turkey                  
(4 countries) 
Albania, Bolivia,                  
Ecuador, Fiji, Ghana,                   
Gambia, Kenya, 
Cambodia, Mali, Malawi,                 
Nicaragua, Senegal,                
Uganda,Venezuela,            
Zambia 
(15 countries) 
Burundi, Ethiopia,                
Haiti, Madagascar,              
Tanzania  
(5 countries) 
Democracy index (OSC)  
Less than 4 
(Authoritarian Regime) 
Nil 
Jordan, Kuwait,                  
Saudi Arabia  
(3 countries) 
Azerbaijan, Burkina 
Faso, China,                   
Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, 
Congo Rep,              
Algeria, Egypt, Gabon,                   
Guinea, Morocco,                
Mauritania, Niger,                  
Nigeria, Pakistan,              
Swaziland, Syrian Arab 
Rep, Togo, Tunisia,               
Vietnam, Yemen Rep.             
(21 countries) 
Bhutan, Central_Afric 
Rep,  Myanmar, Nepal,                   
Rwanda, Sierra  Leone,            
Chad, Congo Democrat 
Rep.  
(8 countries) 
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On the other hand, 25 countries have hybrid regimes and the majority of them (15 countries) score 
40 to 60 score of the globalization index. Only Singapore scores high on globalization index. Four 
countries (Lebanon, Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey) score between 60 and 80 on the globalization 
index. Five countries (Burundi, Ethiopia, Haiti, Madagascar and Tanzania) score poorly on 
globalization index. Among 32 countries that have authoritarian government, only three countries 
(Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) score 60 to 80 on the globalization index and other 29 countries 
score 60 or less. This simple classification scheme also suggests that democratic countries have 
higher degree of concordance with globalization. 
 
Let ijf  be the elements of an observed frequency matrix, ),( nnF ,  
=
=
n
j iji fF 1 and 
.
1 ==
n
i ijj fF Similarly, let ijφ =  =×
n
i iji FFF 1/  be the elements of expected frequency matrix, 
),( nnΦ ,  
=
=Φ nj iji 1φ and .1 ==Φ
n
i ijj φ Let ),( nnD be the matrix of normalized squared 
difference between F and Φ such that ./)( 2 ijijijij fd φφ−= Then,  
= =
=
n
i
n
j ijd1 1δ  is the sum of 
squared deviations of ijf from ijφ normalized by .ijφ This can be decomposed into two parts: the 
sum of the diagonal elements of =dnnD δ),,( 
=
n
i ii
d
1
(which is the trace of D) and the sum of off-
diagonal elements of =odnnD δ),,( .1, ; = ≠
n
ji jiijd  With dδδ , and odδ we may define δδ /ddr =
and .1/ dodod rr −== δδ  In this accounting odδ  weakens the relationship. Larger is the value of dr
higher is the correlation between the attributes measured along the rows and the columns of F. This 
analysis of association of Regime type with (optimistic) extent of Globalization attained by different 
countries during 2006-2014 has been presented in Table-12. We find that δδ /ddr = = 0.57192 = 
47.89981475/83.75227. It shows a week positive relationship between regime type and 
globalization, but strong enough to reject the hypothesis that authoritarianism induces higher 
degree of globalization. This exercise also suggests that any analysis at the gross level (using 
averages or frequencies) might be weak and possibly misleading as well. A more sensitive technique 
like canonical correlation analysis delves deeper into such investigations. 
Table-12. Analysis of Association of Regime Type with Observed (optimistic) extent of Globalization during 2006-2014 
DI 
and 
GI 
Frequencies in DI, GI Cells of F(4,4) Expected Frequencies in DI, GI Cells of Φ(4,4) Normalized Squared Differences D(4,4) 
GI1 GI2 GI3 GI4 Total GI1 GI2 GI3 GI4 Total GI1 GI2 GI3 GI4 Total 
DI1 18 7 0 0 25 4.53 5.60 11.85 3.02 25 40.11 0.35 11.85 3.02 55.33 
DI2 2 12 19 1 34 6.16 7.62 16.12 4.10 34 2.81 2.52 0.51 2.35 8.18 
DI3 1 4 15 5 25 4.53 5.60 11.85 3.02 25 2.75 0.46 0.84 1.30 5.34 
DI4 0 3 21 8 32 5.79 7.17 15.17 3.86 32 5.79 2.43 2.24 4.43 14.89 
Total 21 26 55 14 116 21 26 55 14 116 51.46 5.75 15.44 11.10 83.75 
DI classified into DI1 = Full Democracy; DI2 = Flawed Democracy; DI3 = Hybrid Regime; DI4 = Authoritarian. 
GI classified into GI1 = [80-100]=Very high; GI2 = [60-80)=High ; GI3 = [40-60) = Moderate; GI4 = [0-40) = Low or Poor.  
 
12. Concluding Remarks: In this study we have made an attempt to investigate into the relationship 
between political regime type (that ranges from authoritarian to democratic) and the extent of 
globalization which of late has been considered as a path to development. We have made use of the 
Democracy index (and its constituent indicators) provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit and the 
globalization index (and its constituent indicators) as provided by the KOF. Applying canonical 
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correlation analysis on the data we have made an attempt to look into the response of globalization 
to the quantitative measures of democratic (versus authoritarian) practices of the governments in 
116 countries distributed over Asia, Africa, Australia/Oceania, Europe and the Americas. We have 
also tested the Lee thesis in the context of globalization as a path to development.  Our findings 
indicate that the empirical support to Lee’s thesis if extended to globalization as a path to 
development is superficial and does not withstand critical analysis. Contrary to Lee’s thesis, 
democracy promotes globalization. In African countries political discordance (at the national as well 
as international level) is not much favourable while in the Asian countries, political will, irrespective 
of regime type,  is more or less in concordance with globalization. Therefore, rather illusively, it so 
appears that democracies thwart development as well as globalization as a means to development 
by implication, while the reality is very different. 
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